To fly a plane while building it : NGO's role in the development of REDD+ in Tanzania by Resset, Heidi
  
 
 
TO FLY A PLANE WHILE BUILDING IT 
 
NGO’s Role in the Development of REDD+ in 
Tanzania 
 
by Heidi Resset 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Thesis of Masters Degree by the Department of Social 
Anthropology 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
 
June 2012 
 
 
 
II 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
III 
 
 
TO FLY A PLANE WHILE BUILDING IT 
 
NGO’s Role in the Development of REDD+ in 
Tanzania 
 
 
By Heidi Resset 
 
Thesis of Masters Degree by the Department of Social Anthropology 
 
UNIVERSITY OF OSLO 
 
June 2012 
 
 
  
IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Heidi Resset 
2012 
To Fly A Plane While Building It – NGO’s Role in the Development of REDD+ in Tanzania 
By Heidi Resset 
http://www.duo.uio.no/ 
Print: Oslo Kopisten AS, Oslo 
V 
 
Abstract 
 
In 2009, Norway started funding “REDD+ readiness” in Tanzania, which includes nine pilot 
projects, with a maximum amount of 100 million NOK yearly for 5 years. These pilots are all 
implemented by different nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Before they move to a full-scale 
implementation, the countries are going through this so-called REDD+ readiness process where 
consultation is received, policies are designed, and mechanisms are being tested and evaluated 
(Angelsen et al., 2009, p. 3).  Based on my fieldwork where I spent time with a NGO, and stayed in 
two of their pilot villages, this thesis aims to give an insight into processes that are going on at 
project level under an unfinished framework of the REDD+ forest regime. It concentrates on 
REDD+ as a discourse in the making, and on levels and locations of agency and accountability in 
the process. Here I perceive the events that are driving the discourse into being as what Anna Tsing 
(Tsing, 2005) terms frictions related to the project, where agencies are unfolded. Similarly, I also 
consider some situations where I propose that the necessary frictions are not taking place to detect 
accountability in the process of project implementation. My analysis here recognizes two reasons 
for this; one is that the discourse in the making also draws on similar discourses that already have a 
strong presence in Tanzania, like those of conservation and development. The second reason is the 
respect for what is stipulated in contracts and agreements as opposed to what is not. It is represented 
by two forms of the project – one in the form of the Design, another in the form of Real action. 
Annelise Riles (2000) made this distinction in her analysis of NGO work in Fiji, and I draw several 
parallels to her work on the aesthetics of information, form and facts throughout the thesis. I look 
into aspects of how information sharing is happening through documents in the NGO, and how the 
mechanisms of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) can have significance for the project in 
Tanzania. By doing all this I present ways that the project is in process, and argues that ambitions 
through designs can show that elaboration and implementation of the project at the same time is 
possible, but suggest that the reality of the project can be perceived differently by the people in the 
areas where it is implemented. 
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Overview and Methodology 
 
“Welcome to the ‘Breakfast Debate’, today we will talk about a rather scary topic called REDD …” 
These were the words of the facilitator of the weekly debate at the British Counsel in Dar es Salaam 
that introduced the meeting with those words in early February 2011. Describing what has been by 
interested parties seen as a newly established international forest regime, REDD,
1
 as a scary topic at 
the time reflected the uncertainties surrounding it. What was primarily at stake in international and 
national discussions regarding the program were the undeveloped mechanisms of payments to local 
communities for their work in enhancing the forest cover, the lacking methods for monitoring and 
verifying the carbon sequestration as an indicator for the payments, and the risks of corruption, land 
grabbing and potentially undefined tenure-rights. An abstract from a Christmas-letter to TNRF
2
-
members two months earlier expressed a similarly worried undertone among the nongovernmental 
actors of natural resource management issues in Tanzania:  
 
As to the REDD projects … we will try our best to continue implementing them in close 
collaboration with all those involved. We need to join hands and be stronger during that period. We 
need to be heard more through evidence building. We need to see how we can engage better with the 
government and the private sector. We have a lot of challenges ahead of us and we have to be 
prepared. One of the challenges is related to cost benefit sharing and tenure which we need to take it 
seriously next year. This is not only for the REDD projects but for the TFWG as a whole. This can 
have a negative impact on both REDD and PFM processes which have been going on in the country 
for years.
3
  
 
The uncertainties related to the project made me curious about how they were expressed and 
whether they were expressed, and if not – why not? If yes – why? What kind of expectations and 
perceptions rested with different stakeholders regarding the project? What kind of narratives 
emerged, and how was the REDD+ discourse formed into what? Having raised these questions, it 
further led to look at how the project was planning to be implemented, or piloted, as a form of 
working on the design of it to suit the Tanzanian context of related issues like development work, 
                                                 
1
 I occasionally use REDD instead of REDD+ either in referring to what people have said, or when referring to the 
discourse that took place before the + was added. 
2
 Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) is a NGO that is concentrating on advocacy- and capacity building within 
the nongovernmental natural resource management sector in Tanzania. 
3
 Abstract from letter: ”End of year remarks” circulated to the subscribers of TFWG mailing list, and written by Cassian 2 Tanzania Natural Resource Forum (TNRF) is a NGO that is concentrating on advocacy- and capacity building within 
the nongovernmental natural resource management sector in Tanzania. 
3
 Abstract from letter: ”End of year remarks” circulated to the subscribers of TFWG mailing list, and written by Cassian 
Sianga, Senior Forest Program Officer of Tanzania Natural Resource Forum. 
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forest conservation and Participant Forest Management. I noted to which degree agency and 
accountability was present in different acts. I also had a look into how information was distributed, 
developed, and argued, in documents and how some of it was disseminated to the villages. During 
my fieldwork I was not aware of the significance that the highly legitimizing strategy of Free, Prior 
and Informed Consent (FPIC) was supposed to have for this project, and this was something I 
became interested in during the stage of writing. I will explain more about this strategy in chapter 5.  
One can say that REDD+ has emerged from the faith in trade as a more sustainable way of 
development cooperation than funding. It is hoped to be a new solution to present problems within 
development thinking. This is a brilliant idea, and at the international level it still continues to be. 
The importance of REDD+ events have on several occasions been expressed by stakeholders, for 
example when they use a considerable time during their speeches to say that this is the first time in 
history that we are arranging a meeting of this size to discuss [the component of REDD+] at the 
international level. This is an example on how creations of an aesthetical side of the project is 
taking place among stakeholders, as they start feeling that they are part of something very big and 
important since it is the first time in history that the events are taking place. My thesis is aiming to 
unfold some ideas on the aesthetics of working on this “new”, large project, which contains a lot of 
money, and where several project proponents can have a lot to say on “lessons learnt”4 from the 
project. 
 Background: What is REDD+?
5
 
 
REDD+ (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation) is believed, by many 
actors in the field of environment- and development policy and research issues at international 
level, to be the best possible solution to cope with today’s climate changes and environmental 
threats to the world. It is based on the idea that it is possible to increase carbon sequestration by 
more sustainable management of the world’s tropical forests while companies in developed 
countries can pay the communities that are preserving those forests through a REDD carbon market 
. The REDD+ implementation plan has been based on ideas about land tenure reforms, forest 
                                                 
4
 “Lessons learnt” is an expression that is frequently used within aid-business and development-work, and it has also 
been mentioned a lot in relation to the REDD+ piloting. 
5
 The Carbon Positive web-pages explain REDD as: “An initiative to cut greenhouse gas emissions associated with 
forest clearing by the inclusion of ‘avoided deforestation’ in carbon market mechanisms. More simply, payment in 
return for the active preservation of existing forests.” REDD+ is further described as: “The extra consideration in 
reducing greenhouse emissions beyond deforestation and forest degradation (REDD) being given to sustainable forest 
management and afforestation/reforestation in developing countries” (CarbonPositive, 2010). 
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management planning, reduced impact logging, expansions of forest reserves, wildfire prevention, 
forest law enforcement, and Payments for Environmental Services (PES) amongst other things.  
In 2009, Norway started funding “REDD+ readiness” in Tanzania, which includes nine pilot 
projects, with a maximum contribution of 100 million NOK yearly over a 5 year period. These 
pilots are all implemented by different nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Before they 
transition into a full-scale implementation, the countries are going through a so-called REDD+ 
readiness process where consultations are received, policies are designed, and mechanisms are 
being tested and evaluated (Angelsen et al., 2009, p. 3) The intention has been that the Government 
is meant to be responsible in having the ownership of the process, and emphasis has been put upon 
the single country’s extended opportunities to impose on the design of the projects through 
preparations of national frameworks and strategies (Angelsen et al., 2009, Tømte, 2011). In parallel 
with this, a 5-years CCIAM Programme is also introduced as a cooperating initiative between four 
Tanzanian research institutions and UMB, which aim is to provide research on relevant issues on 
climate change challenges in Tanzania. Related to this, the word design is important. The processes 
going on at almost every level are about designing. The design must fit into an already well-known 
pattern, and making initiatives link in a way that will promote a smooth national adaption of the 
project. More of this will be elaborated on in chapter 4. 
In its initial stages, REDD+ was not really perceived by national stakeholders – like governmental 
staff, professors and NGO-staff – as a more unique chance than other developmental projects by the 
leaders themselves, but rather as ordinary funding with external obligations attached to it. I will 
come back to this in chapter 2. The cause of this perception might have something to do with all the 
uncertainties and lack of information attached to the project at this stage. Nongovernmental 
stakeholders have first and foremost been the ones requiring answers to uncertainties surrounding 
the international standards, and this is something I will revisit in chapter 5 as it relates to the 
accountability and agency of NGO-actors. 
 Natural Resource Management in Tanzania 
A brief Historical Excerpt 
In the 20 years, between 1990 and 2010, Tanzania lost 19,4% of its forest cover, equal to 8 067 000 
hectares (Butler, 1999-2012). The most likely causes of forest degradation are the expansion of 
agriculture, pasture, wildfires, unsustainable use of the forest, illegal harvesting, firewood- and 
4 
 
charcoal-production and illegal mining. 90% of Tanzania’s consumption of wood goes for charcoal 
and wood fuel (URT-MEM, 2012), the first goes mainly for towns.  
In Tanzania, as in many other African countries, the right to land has been perceived as something 
so essential for existence that to be denied the access to it has been equated to being denied the right 
to live (Barume, 2011, p. 55). By 2009, a quarter of Tanzania’s land had been put under so-called 
fortress conservation, a term that “… expresses the conservation strategy that sets aside protected 
areas such as national parks or game reserves and restricts local people from living, hunting or 
herding there.” (Townsend, 2009, p. 93) The Land Ordinance of 1923 said: 
 
WHEREAS it is expedient that the existing customary rights of the natives of the Tanganyika 
Territory to use and enjoy the land of the Territory and the natural fruits thereof in sufficient quantity 
to enable them to provide for the sustenance of themselves their families and their posterity should 
be assured protected and preserved; … 
BE IT THEREFORE ENACTED by the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Tanganyika 
Territory as follows:  
… 
2. The whole of the lands of the Territory, whether occupied or unoccupied, on the date of the 
commencement of this Ordinance are hereby declared to be public lands.  
(Governor Byatt, 1923) 
 
The first formal land law in the former Tanganyika
6
 was introduced in 1928, and involved 
regulation of tenure for authorities and white people, whereas other people had the tenure regulated 
under the old law of customary rights adjudicated by local authorities. State forest management in 
Tanzania started under the German colonial rule as a way of securing control over access to natural 
resources. This implied symbolic control and revenues to the state. It happened at the expense of 
traditional property-ownership systems of customary rights to resources, and caused several 
conflicts between peasants and the state. The problem was solved, by combining peasant resistance 
and labor shortage with licensed forest cultivation. As a result, the people living in rural areas have 
mainly had an understanding that they have access to forest and woodlands as basic rights, even 
during colonial times. However, due to Tanzania’s National Forest Programme (NFP) of 2001 they 
are now perceived as the main cause of deforestation, who need to be reigned in through stricter 
                                                 
6
 Tanganyika was the name of the Tanzanian mainland from the time before the union with Zanzibar on 26th April 
1964. 
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controls (Sunseri, 2005). In the 1980’s there was a paradigm shift in the perceptions towards 
peasants’ residences, which became seen as a threat to biodiversity, and people were forced to 
migrate as a result. Beginning in the 1990’s the international blueprint of community forest 
management emerged in Tanzania as an alternative to fortress conservation. It has been criticized 
for its injustice in terms of dispossessing people of their traditional ways and livelihood. (Loiske, 
1995, Neumann, 1998, Sunseri, 2005, Townsend, 2009) In the following part there will be more 
about the history of these projects in Africa that fall under the category of Community Based 
Natural Resource Management (CBNRM).  
Conservation-NGOs, like the one I have been allowed to follow in different settings throughout my 
fieldwork, have come to have a major influence on the policies on forest and biodiversity that have 
flourished in Tanzania the last two decades, something that resulted from the National Forest 
Programme. Thaddeus Sunseri (2005) describes this as hegemony of biological preservationists, 
donors and NGOs that have been growing since 1989.  
The expanded formalizations of land and natural resources are in conflict with the traditional 
Tanzanian way of relating to the land and “the natural fruits” that are referred to in the Land 
Ordinance. However, the long history of forest conservation and the well-established presence of 
conservation NGOs in Tanzania have increasingly changed the way of thinking about the natural 
resources. In the villages where I stayed people had heard about the importance of conservation 
through radios. “I am happy to stay nearby the forest,” the much respected Babu Jema from Lunenzi 
village told me. As he was rolling his tobacco, he raised his eyebrows and pointed with his chin 
towards the forested mountain-ridge right in front of us from where we were standing. “It makes the 
soil fertile because it gives us the rain. I remember one time somebody from another village started 
to clear, up there in the forest, I went over with two other men and we convinced him to go 
somewhere else.” They had tried to conserve the forest themselves, as several villagers had told me, 
but without a respected law-system there were still people clearing in areas where there were 
village-rules that said they should not. The village rules were also vague, and few people knew for 
instance where the boarders of where they could cultivate were.  
In cities, I found that various people were quite focused on the issue of climate change. It was like 
an established truth to them – I would say much more than to the average Norwegian. “It gets hotter 
every year in Dar,” said the cook at my guesthouse. Her next sentence was followed by two 
confirming nods by her friend, a taxi-driver who sometimes stopped by; “It’s because of the global 
warming”. I did not hear anybody say that they did not believe in the climate change threats, and 
people believed that they had seen or experienced the effects. One of my informants, Makaa, was 
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quite negative to forest conservation because he saw that farmers did not get the promised benefits. 
At the same time, he was absolutely sure that he had seen climate change in the forms of floods and 
droughts. The reason for the establishment of this truth can be a mixture of the high emphasis of it 
in the national debate, similar to how Agrawal (2002) describes the making of environmental 
subjects and “environmentality” by changing through politics the way people think about the 
environment in India. This happens in Tanzania by producing extensive information
7
 about it 
through radio, and in relation to occasions of uncontrollable environmental events like unsteady 
rainfall and floods.  
On Participatory Forest Management 
Participatory Forest Management (PFM) was first piloted in Tanzania in the early 1990’s and as it 
coincided with reviews of the national land policies at the time, the PFM mechanisms have received 
a strong legal foundation of support, and has been distributed through GOs and NGOs all over the 
country (Blomley and Ramadhani, 2005, Malimbwi and Zahabu, 2008). PFM can be described as a 
system on how to engage people living near forest-areas to participate in the “planning, 
management, use and conservation of forest resources through the development of individual and 
community rights” (URT, 2002, Sect II, 3(b)). It became part of the Forest Act enacted by the 
Parliament in 2002, and has been implemented through the work of several NGOs before and after.  
There are several terms worldwide that can be used on these kinds of forest management initiatives 
that roughly signify the same phenomenon of “local participation” and “benefit sharing”. 
(Neumann, 1998). For example is Community Based Natural Resource Management (CBNRM) 
another term, which is not only about the forest, but all natural resources. There seems to be small 
differences between those terms, and that the differences lie in the way that they are translated by 
different organizations and in different countries. CBNRM is based on the principles:  
 
… that local populations have a greater interest in the sustainable use of resources than does the state 
or distant corporate managers, that local communities are more cognizant of the intricacies of local 
ecological processes and practices, and that communities are more able to effectively manage those 
resources through local or traditional forms of access. (Brosius et al., 2005) 
 
                                                 
7
 I have heard about several media-organizations focusing only on environmental issues in their communication. Those 
that I know the names of are ”The Journalists Environmental Association of Tanzania” (JET), registered in 1991, and 
Environment Media Network (EMNet), established in 2008. The NGOs that I followed during my fieldwork cooperated 
with the latter. 
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The common term used in governmental documents and by implementing organizations in Tanzania 
is PFM, which has been emphasized and included within the Forest Act (URT, 2002). 
A keystone of success is realized when the forest and its environs are enhanced as a result of these 
projects. While the village forest managers have made great efforts to take care of the forests, the 
vast majority of the people living in those rural areas have unfortunately been shut down from 
receiving any incentives as a result of quitting their former activities. The MJUMITA Executive 
Director expressed in an interview in Southern Voices: “… they have actually been protecting the 
forest for nothing, as volunteers”, instead of receiving the 40 % income from the sale of forest 
products, which is the aim (SouthernVoices, 2011). In the end of chapter 2, I will describe how 
technical advisors in the piloting organizations where I did my fieldwork explain how this relates to 
their organizations objective for implementing REDD+. These were the cooperating organizations 
Tanzania Forest Conservation Group (TFCG) and the Federation of Community Forest 
Conservation Network in Tanzania (MJUMITA
8
),  
There are two versions of PFM that differ in terms of ownership. Joint Forest Management (JFM) 
and Community Based Forest Management (CBFM) are both implemented under REDD+ piloting, 
but TFCG / MJUMITA excluded the first version although their Project Proposal opened up for 
implementation of both versions. The explanation provided by Technical Advisor and other staff in 
TFCG is that; as JFM works as a joint agreement between the local or central Government and the 
villages in reserves, where the Government is the owner of the area and the people managing the 
forests are from the surrounding villages, under REDD+ there could be a high risk that the 
governments would get all the revenues, and the managers nothing. CBFM, on the other hand, is 
perceived as a highly viable option under REDD+, since the forests in questions are normally 
located on village-land, and hence the management of the forest and the revenues from it is not 
owned by anybody else but the villagers. In the part about land tenure in chapter 3 I will later come 
back to some surprises that the NGOs got regarding this after the site-selection for REDD+. 
More specifically, I learned TFCG’s basic steps of CBFM while I was staying in one of the villages 
where they did another project: One was to locate the area of the forest, and then a Natural 
Resource Committee was to be selected. Third was to make a synopsis of all the species that can be 
found in the forest before making a plan on how to conserve the forest, and bi-laws were to be made 
in relation to this. After some time they would test whether the forest management is working. In 
addition to CBFM, they would start up income-generating activities depending on what the villages 
                                                 
8
 MJUMITA is an abbreviation of the Swahili name of the organization: Shirikisho la Mitandao ya Jamii ya Usimamizi 
wa Misitu Tanzania. 
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would want, for instance beekeeping or butterfly farming. After some time they learned that what 
the villages needed, were improved mechanisms for doing agriculture. Therefore, they have hired 
an agriculture-expert. 
 Research Questions and Positioning 
 
To what degree can anthropological research contribute in these early stages of REDD+ 
implementation? I want to refer to a working paper developed as part of the multi-country project 
Poverty and sustainable development impacts of REDD architecture led by the International 
Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) and the University of Life Sciences at Ås 
(UMB) where it is stated that:  
 
… it can evidently be argued that there is dearth of empirical evidence on REDD, and as such, 
available theoretical support cannot be generalized for REDD policy prescription and strategies for a 
specific country or local communities. Many developing countries and their local communities differ 
in many aspects, such as … institutional capacities; REDD options to be offered and their associated 
costs and benefits; and the ways in which REDD mechanisms will be designed and implemented.  
(Mwakalobo et al., 2011, p. 1) 
 
This is true for the REDD+ Programme overall, and part of what is interesting with the 
anthropological fieldworks done on REDD+ is therefore to see details of how differently they are 
designed and implemented from one country to another, and especially from one continent to 
another. If one for instance compares REDD+ in an African setting against a Latin-American 
setting one would find quite considerable differences because of both socio-historical and 
environmental variations. In Latin-American countries the term indigenous is a politically charged 
term that is frequently related to situations where a group of people get unfair treatment. Larson and 
Aminzade (Angelsen et al., 2009) are explaining how political actors in Bolivia and Peru have used 
the term indigenous as part of mobilization for electoral contests. In an African setting a lot of 
people do not relate to being either indigenous or not indigenous, and in many places they are not 
always as active in claiming their rights as groups that are treated badly. Therefore, one could 
assume that a new project like REDD+ would meet more debate, and also resistance, among the 
target populations in Latin-American countries than in the African countries. Ingunn Bardalen 
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(2011) described in her thesis how indigenous groups in Bolivia have strongly resisted REDD+, in 
reluctance of doing what they understood as having to sell their oxygen.  
Something we should be vigilant of is to which degree international agreements on a forest regime 
can be able to take local contexts and specificity into consideration. In this thesis I have also been 
concerned about to which degree the projects that have been implemented at the local level also 
become mutually dependent on the processes at the international level. An anthropological account 
must be a reminder to the REDD+ dealers at the international level of the actual actions and 
procedures where the project is taking place in a specific context in order to see what high level 
decisions leads to on the ground.  
To get a picture of institutional capacities in Tanzania is important for understanding how 
“mechanisms” are “designed” in this context, and why they are designed this way. I argue that this 
links to the questions; why is the project perceived as “nothing new” to Tanzania, and why is it still 
so warmly welcomed? I believe it can be necessary to have a look at social interactions. A new 
world of sociological thinking opened up to me sometime during spring 2011 as we went through 
Bruno Latour’s Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory (2005) in a 
course I attended. The book is still a mystery to me in terms of applicability, but that is also what it 
is meant to be. It is challenging deeply rooted ideas about “society” and “the social”, devices that 
we do not really grab the content of. He promotes a “sociology of associations”, where “connection 
between things that are not themselves social” (Latour, 2005, p. 5) should be traced. It has inspired 
me in the work of this thesis – mostly in the way he is making a distinction between intermediaries 
and mediators as the means to produce the social. The first one transports force or meaning without 
transformation, which is the less preferred one for what he terms the sociologists of associations, 
the actor-network-theorists, or the ANTs. In most cases these are the black-boxes, that are assumed 
to have the same output as input, and hence they produce nothing of what all too easily have been 
categorized as “network”, “power” or other social aggregations. The mediators are on the other 
hand plural, or endless. Output is hardly the same as input. He points out that it is necessary to 
discover what entities are behaving as intermediaries and what are mediators, to figure out what are 
the uncertainties in social interaction. It is important to recognize that also non-humans are included 
here, and that these can also have agency. Instead of making black-box-theories of for instance 
“power” or “network” as single social aggregates, we have to trace all the causalities for these 
aggregates, and usually it has to be done by identifying the mediators, their inputs and outputs. It is, 
the way I see it, a perpetual project. 
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It is however possible to use some of Latour’s ideas, even though it might be rational to strive for 
incompleteness. Anna Tsing has made a similar account in her book Friction (2005), in where I 
believe that the different forms of frictions presented are equal to the mediators that Latour 
describes. One good example is where she describes the different processes in the commodity-chain 
of coal, where bargaining and strategies meet in different cultural economies in relation to the same 
commodity. To understand why the miners are not profiting, she examines how time-consuming the 
bargaining is in every step of the commodity-chain (Tsing, 2005, pp. 51-54). Tsing points out that 
encounters can be both compromising and empowering:  
 
Speaking of friction is a reminder of the importance of interaction in defining movement, cultural 
form, and agency. Friction is not just about slowing things down. Friction is required to keep global 
power in motion. It shows us [...] where the rubber meets the road. [...] Roads create pathways that 
make motion easier and more efficient, but in doing so they limit where we go. The ease of travel 
they facilitate is also a structure of confinement. Friction inflects historical trajectories, enabling, 
excluding, and particularizing. (Tsing, 2005, p. 6) 
 
There might be several causes of friction, depending on what information is reaching stakeholders, 
and their interests and agency. Tsing explains how incidents of friction can be a good way of 
moving forward in processes that are involving several parts. A relevant account related to REDD+, 
could be that the expression of standpoints and views on the progress of projects creates a positive 
environment for different ways to reach agreement without necessarily possessing exactly the same 
opinions about the issue. Friction is not always positive in the way that it can also mean complete 
disagreement, but these disagreements can evoke new processes that can evolve into something 
else, which might be good or bad. She thinks it is important to stop and see what really is going on 
during these events called friction, to understand what leads to what, and why.  
In this thesis I have tried to do something similar to Tsing. What I am following is the discourse on 
REDD+ in Tanzania. I will expand on incidents of friction in the REDD+ processes at national and 
NGO level throughout the next chapter as a way of explaining the dynamics in how the project is 
being shaped in time and space. I do not have, however, the same scope as Tsing. She has made an 
ethnographical account of global connections, looking at relatively old local events of friction to 
describe what is happening in the global present. I have been concerned with what is instrumental in 
forming the discourse on REDD+ in Tanzania as we speak. Although I do partly go back in local 
and national history to underscore my points, I use my recent empirical examples to describe why 
and how the project is progressing in Tanzania. I also use them to see to which degree discursive 
elements at the international level has a dominate role that influences decision making, or if agency 
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is also located elsewhere, and which role the project designed by TFCG / MJUMITA play within 
REDD+ as a discourse in the making. I ask what are the perceptions and expectations of the project 
among different stakeholders and institutions, and, furthermore, how can this explain the design of 
the project versus the acting of the project at different stages in the process? In relation to this I look 
into what way Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC), as a mechanism of supplementing REDD+ 
to ensure the interests and rights of directly affected groups of people, is realized within the project. 
I use an actor-oriented approach to follow some events where the discourse on REDD+ is produced, 
and where friction erupts. There is nevertheless not only mediators to be considered here, I propose 
that it is also important to consider what appear as intermediaries. The actor-oriented sociology is 
concentrating on holistic descriptions of encounters between actors and their perceptions and life-
worlds (Long, 2001). I have done this mainly by considering certain relevant aspects with what can 
roughly be termed here as the “world of the villagers” and the “world of the NGO-staff” while 
describing their internal and external interaction. As a result of my impulses from Latour, I have 
chosen to give little attention to the black-box of “power”, something that is central in the actor-
oriented sociology (Kontinen, 2004). What I rather find as a useful expression, is that of agency. 
Agency is approved by all of them – Latour, Tsing and Long. I find the content of the word 
“power” too difficult to decide in whether it should be treated as something that the holder of power 
is conscious or unconscious of. My assumption has been that the latter provides a more fair 
meaning to the term, but then I have had difficulties understanding the purpose of using it. Again, I 
think Latour gives the reasonable solution to this in the way he wants to trace the cause of “power” 
as a social aggregate, which means, again the way I see it, that there is a need to make quite 
overwhelming accounts. In this thesis I found it more reasonable to see whether agency, as the 
ability to influence, can be discovered in concrete actions. The way Tsing explores agency is by 
asking; “what kinds of individuals or groups can make change?” (Tsing, 2005, p. 214) In relation to 
this euphemization is also considered (Scott, 1985). 
 Methodology 
Fieldwork 
TFCG was established in 1985 and with adequate experience within Participant Forest Management 
(PFM) implementation, was the first organization to receive an approval to go through with 
REDD+-funding projects in Tanzania. Their Project Proposal is called Making REDD and the 
carbon market work for communities and forest conservation in Tanzania. The main cooperating 
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organization is MJUMITA – a so-called local community network-organization for those 
communities that have their forests organized under PFM. I was allowed to follow the initial 
processes of their project, and spent three months with the NGO in Dar es Salaam and at many 
different field-sites where I followed their project activities. This was followed up by another three 
months in two of the villages that they have been chosen for REDD+ implementation. Besides this I 
have been participating in five workshops and one conference about the project in Dar es Salaam, 
and the launch at district- and village level during this first stay in Tanzania. I got to follow the site-
selection process, which was of particular interest. In February 2011 I went back to Tanzania for 
two weeks and visited the organization and the villages again. The last observations of the REDD+ 
processes in Tanzania were done during my six months stay in Dar es Salaam in the autumn of 2011 
while I had an internship at the Royal Norwegian Embassy. I did not do any further fieldwork 
during this last period, but the more holistic picture I got of the project in this period has affected 
the result of this thesis. 
My data is based on interviews and stories from people working in the two NGOs and one ex-
employee in one of them, as well as stories from people living in the two sub-villages, and a survey 
I did of 30 households in both of them. This last method was more a way to get to know and 
communicate with people, and I have not used all the results from the survey, as I found the 
outcomes less reliable. I found it very difficult to make people open up and tell my translator and 
me their stories if I asked them straight out about things, but if I started the conversation with the 
survey it happened sometimes that they gave additional information that was quite interesting. The 
data is also based on participant observations, meaning my own experiences of events that took 
place during my presence, where information and opinions were shared and decisions were made. 
To some extent I have also used a method similar to that of Tsing, by observing traces of events, 
which had already taken place. This could be information that I got through conversations with 
people, but also through official documents I read, such as reports and news-articles. I strived to 
follow the project in the settings where it was enacted to different times, in Dar es Salaam, on 
fieldtrips, to the villages or in the district centre of Kilosa. As time went by and there were fewer 
official activities going on in the project that I could participate in before the selection of villages, I 
went to one of TFCGs project-sites where implementation of land use planning was going on, and 
learned about their methodologies of implementation. After the villages were selected, I chose to 
stay in one of them. I chose the villages for practical reasons, because they were bordering another 
village where I had a few contacts , and where they had phone-signals, a dispensary and a small 
guesthouse with a generator. This village did not become a site for piloting REDD+ itself because it 
did not have enough forest of the kind that the project proponents had evaluated as beneficial for 
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REDD+. My plan was to stay in only one sub-village, but during my first day there I learned that 
the dense forest was mainly located inside the other village, and that people from the first village 
still kept farms up there in the second village. I thought it would be interesting to get to know the 
people in both of them, to see how they cooperated, and if there could be any potential for 
disagreements and conflicts on boarders and revenues. What I also later found out was that since the 
villages were located quite far away from the district centre, the forest was not very much exploited 
from charcoal-production compared to how it was utilized closer to Kilosa town. 
In order to conduct my fieldwork, I employed a translator. As I had only a short amount of time to 
gather information in the villages, there was no way I could understand a mixture of Kigogo, 
Kihehe, Kisagara and Kiswahili and at the same time get some useful data for my purpose. To use a 
translator was of course also challenging, as I lacked the opportunity to take advantage of situations 
as soon as they occurred. It also created a distance between my informants and me, but what was 
positive was that the translator also helped me in translating cultural codes, which I then further 
translated in my anthropological mind. She also served as a research-assistant and a friend. 
Doing a focus-group meeting taught me several things, amongst others how almost useless this 
forum was in gathering honest opinions. This is one of the methodologies frequently being used by 
Tanzanian NGOs, and also during the implementation of REDD+. I invited some men and women 
that I had been talking to, and that seemed to be interested in sharing their opinions in the focus 
groups, but the result was that the men came instead of their wives, whom I had invited, and it was 
a challenge to engage them in the discussions that I initiated. A reason could be that they did not 
understand my purpose of engaging them, and another could be that the themes for the discussions 
were either too challenging or too sensitive to take it seriously. An example was this theme:  “How 
do you cooperate with the neighbouring village of [Lunenzi or Ibingu]?” Generally, answers to 
these questions were given in consensus, without discussion. When one man took the lead in 
answering, the other people in the group were usually joining him in his jovial conclusion.  
The survey I found to be the most effective way of gathering information, although not completely 
reliable, and not sufficient for a quantitative analysis. The questions in this survey were about their 
subsistence-sphere, religious practices and use of the forest among other things, and some of the 
information has been used for my analytical conclusions.  
In Dar es Salaam I spent most of my time at the TFCG / MJUMITA office, arranging interviews, 
and participating in workshops, conferences and fieldtrips. The challenge here was to define my 
role in the field. I was bound to write a lot during these events, as well as making time for observing 
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the workshop itself. Even though I sometimes understood that my participation was expected, this 
was not my purpose while doing research, and I therefore stayed as passive as possible, as it would 
be difficult to combine this with participation. At the same time I found it morally difficult to just 
“take in” information, almost like a spy, without anybody knowing really what I would use it for in 
the end – myself included. “What are you writing?” was a question I got both from the NGO-staff 
and the villagers, and I usually said it was something that might be relevant for my thesis, but I was 
not sure. That last part was probably enough in the situation to disarm my notebook and me. I 
learned early on that if I said I was unsure, or that I did not know, was a way I could express myself 
in order to avoid appearing as a figure of authority.  
That being said, I wish I had been able to do my fieldwork more openly. Maybe a methodology 
similar to that of George E. Marcus (Marcus and Faubion, 2009) where he describes as a more 
formal design process would have been a solution to my problem regarding contribution. He 
addresses the problem of what he terms “double agent-cy”, where the anthropologist is trying to 
produce research for both “us” and “them”, both as a contribution within the discipline and for the 
broader audience. In my case it is for the NGOs and other REDD+ stakeholders in addition to 
contributing within the anthropological discipline. Marcus believes that it is time for a new focus 
for anthropological research-methods, and he turns specifically towards scholars and first 
fieldworks. This should be based on incorporating the “explicit norms and forms of collaborations 
into the culture of metamethod” (Marcus and Faubion, 2009, p. 30) through a constant feedback 
from the fieldworker’s collaborations and the broader reception. He thinks we should include these 
responses into the meta-methodological aspects of fieldwork, which he terms as the way that the 
fieldwork is changing towards the changing environment’s expectations, and the conditions for 
implementation. This will form the design of the project, where a carefully conceived 
incompleteness should be the norm of the result. The incompleteness is about realizing the limits of 
fieldwork, and these partial, but specifically argued results should be the norm. 
Such an approach could be preferable for anthropological fieldworks that are conducted among 
NGOs or other organizations, instead of the traditionally individual, what Marcus terms 
“Malinowskian” approach. It is also important to remember that Marcus does not want the 
researcher to forget about the ideology of anthropological fieldwork while also receiving impetus or 
feedback from other places. I went to the field with a wish to do a “Malinowskian” approach, and 
have followed this to the degree that I could. I was afraid of being biased by too much 
communication and cooperation with the NGO. I nevertheless realize that a more receptive meta-
method like the one Marcus describes would probably have helped me, if I were able to balance it 
with independency. Putting more emphasis on communicating my limited findings and having 
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feedback from the NGO on my work could have led to a different thesis, but in the end my analysis 
has been bound to take a more “Marcusian” direction in the way that the main corresponding 
literature that I have used has been urging to deploy a vocabulary that is established in the 
environment where the research is done (Riles, 2000) and to not make use of too many “black 
boxes” of theory (Latour, 2005). Elaborations of this literature will be done in the following 
chapters.  
Analysis 
Besides the empirical data and interviews gathered during my fieldwork, analysis is also based on a 
study of different laws, regulations and project documents on REDD+. This has been necessary to 
understand obligations in relation to agency and accountability. It has also been necessary to 
understand the agency of documents themselves, as part of a “worknet” of social interaction, the 
way that Bruno Latour’s (2005) describes it through an actor-network-theory (ANT). I have had 
Latour’s work in the back of my head while writing, but I have not been able, or even wanted, to 
follow him completely. I believe it presupposes a quite different methodology for conducting 
fieldwork than what I have done, where one should trace every single detail of a causality-relation 
empirically to claim any cause at all. To the extent that I have used Latour’s methods, I have first 
and foremost tried to prevent a tendency of the use of terms that Latour would deny as irrelevant 
and unreliable “black-boxes”. This could be terms as “power” and “society”. As he says that his 
contribution is a proposition, not a refutation, of existing theories (Latour, 2005, p. 12), I think it 
legitimizes, to some extent at least, my use of terms like “agency”, “accountability” and 
“discourse”, which are in the focus for this thesis.  
The analysis is mainly concerned with events of human and non-human interaction in relation to the 
development of the project that has been in my focus, and what comes out of them in the form of a 
discourse. I use the works of Michel Foucault, Norman Long, Annelise Riles and Anna Tsing 
mainly in a way that values the significance of interim connections in the way that Latour perceives 
them. Riles (2000) does something quite contrary to how Latour describes the continuing processes 
of reconfirming products of events, but is not talking about a “network” that exists in its own right. 
Riles is describing a “network” within development- and NGO workers in Fiji where the “network” 
exists in the sense that people are talking about it. Norman Long (2001), in his actor-oriented 
approach, is not focusing social changes entirely on processes of completely determined, linear and 
external paths forced by international bodies or the state, but on how the frameworks of social 
action are composed by the outcomes of actors’ “projects”.  
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This thesis aims to give an insight into processes that are going on at project level under an 
unfinished framework of the REDD+ forest regime. It concentrates on REDD+ as a discourse in the 
making, and on levels and locations of agency and accountability in the process. I am here 
specifically referring to the agencies and accountabilities of the piloting organizations in Tanzania, 
with the work of the two organizations TFCG and MJUMITA in focus. I perceive the events that 
are driving the discourse into being as frictions related to the project, where agencies are unfolded. 
Similarly, I also consider some situations where I propose that the necessary frictions are not taking 
place to detect accountability in the process of project implementation. My analysis here recognizes 
two reasons for this; one is that the discourse in the making also draws on similar discourses that 
already have a strong presence in Tanzania, like those of conservation and development. The 
second reason is the respect for what is stipulated in contracts and agreements as opposed to what is 
not. It is represented by two forms of the project – one in the form of the design, another in the form 
of real action. Annelise Riles (2000) made this distinction in her analysis of NGO work in Fiji, and 
I draw several parallels to her work on the aesthetics of information, form and facts throughout the 
thesis. I look into aspects of how information sharing is happening through documents in the NGO, 
and on the significance that the mechanisms of Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) can have 
for the project in Tanzania. By doing all this I present ways that the project is in process, and argues 
that ambitions through designs can show that elaboration and implementation of the project at the 
same time is possible, whereas results of real action show that this is a matter of perception.  
Terminology and Presentation 
The overall topic of my thesis, as part of a discourse within development aid, makes the analysis 
prone to talk about aspects of power (Agrawal, 2002, Brosius, 1999, Escobar, 1995, Ferguson, 
1990), in the spirit of the paradigm in anthropological studies of development introduced by James 
Ferguson in his book The Anti-Politics Machine (Ferguson, 1990) that drew on Michel Foucault’s 
work on power and discourses. Although I recognize that it can be a legitimate expression 
depending on the basis for analysis, I have chosen here to do as Tsing (2005) and to not go into 
questioning and localizing holders of power for the reason of the difficulty to determine it, and next, 
tracing the causality for it can be equally difficult. I find the word agency a more appropriate 
expression for my purpose. I use it to explain how different people have the opportunity to act and 
“promote”, regardless of whether they have the power to make the results of these acts and 
promotions become constitutive. The way Bruno Latour (2005) explains the use of the term power 
within sociology, he says that it has come to be about either rather transient face-to-face 
interactions, where asymmetries cannot really be accounted, or about those “tautological forces” 
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that cannot be proved empirically viable. What is essential in Latour’s explanations of actor-
network-theory is that objects, in the sense of material things, have to be included within the work-
net of interactions. The objects are forgotten about when scientists are explaining the sociology of 
the social, and this, he claims, leads to the fact that they are also forgetting about them when it 
comes to the appeals to power relations and social inequalities. He explains that these objects are 
mediators where signifiers of power are produced, and to not consider them means to “hide the real 
causes of social inequalities” (Latour, 2005, p. 85) Instead of emphasizing the use of “power”, 
which he questions whether might only be an expression of the “social explainers’’ lust of power 
themselves, one should do an effort in explaining it through these objects of causes. The objects in 
between the efforts and the effects can sometimes make the effects into something else than what 
was the purpose of the efforts. In my case this is why I have chosen to focus on agency as efforts to 
impose, as effects of the project were hardly to be found at the time of my fieldwork. If one wishes 
to study “power-relations” and “social inequalities”, Latour says that one at least also has to explain 
the means and efficacy of domination.  
Regarding the presentation of data, it has been important to do it in such a gentle manner as possible 
in relation to the personal life of my informants both in the NGOs and the villages. I have found it 
relevant to refer to certain positions in the organizations, and I am therefore thankful for the 
permissions to do that. In a couple of cases I have chosen to give the informants an anonymous 
name. This is because of uncertainties to whether the person has given me information without 
considering own security regarding relations to friends and colleagues. I have not considered it 
necessary to put other names on the villages where I have done my fieldwork, because I find it 
rather important that stakeholders know which villages I talk about so that the information I give 
may be useful to the project in these villages. If I in any person’s opinion have falsely attributed to 
the villages through my descriptions, I deeply apologize for that, and the liability is all on me. I 
have done the descriptions with the idea that they were important to create a contextual picture of 
the setting for the project in Tanzania, and in the same way that someone can disagree in my 
presentation, my hope and belief is that many villagers will agree with it, as it is also based on their 
statements.  
The quotations here are not directly cited all through this thesis, except from the interviews with 
NGO staff where I used a voice recorder. These interviews have been presented in a form of 
conversation between the person I interviewed and myself. I use the same form to present the 
meetings held by NGO-staff in the villages, although everything has been translated during the 
meetings with the help of my translator. The rest of the quotations in the text have the same 
punctuation regardless if I have written them down immediately or a bit later during the day. In the 
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villages I have, as already mentioned, used my translators. This can mean that content has been 
changed or missed, but by discussing with my translators, my understandings of the meanings with 
what people say can also have been improved. In the context of workshops in Dar es Salaam, 
information has mainly been written down at once, and quotations are either completely or close to 
similar to how it was said. In the setting of fieldtrips and random talk with NGO-staff, the 
conversations have mainly been scribbled down during the evening time, and the quotations are 
therefore based on my memory, which means that the same content might have been said with 
different words.  
Thesis Outline 
Chapter 2 is an introduction to the stage that the REDD+ had reached in Tanzania at the time I 
arrived. It has the ambition to define some of the expectations towards REDD+ at international, 
national and NGO level in the early stages of introducing the project in Tanzania. Why did 
Tanzania become a pilot country? To what degree was the Tanzanian Government interested? What 
kinds of expectations were there from the NGO’s side? It touches also upon some of the themes that 
I will return to in the following chapters, for instance how the international commitments are crucial 
for the NGOs to be able to move forward, although the international discourse of REDD+ is still 
changing in the context at these different levels. I use Norman Long’s analytical framework of 
social interface to explain how the process of defining and imposing on a REDD+ discourse is 
dynamic.  
Chapter 3 gives a presentation of the local settings for REDD+ implementation before any activities 
have yet been started. It aims to give an understanding of why it can be important to have 
considerable knowledge about the villages and preferably some attachment to the place in form of 
earlier co-operation before project implementation. A second aim is to question whether the two 
terms that are part of the REDD+ discourse to address target populations for REDD+ revenues, 
local communities and indigenous people, are really the best terms to be used in the Tanzanian 
setting. 
Chapter 4 is concerned with some elements of the REDD+ discourse and how they interact and 
counteract. It also surrounds the accountability and advocacy of the NGO in relation to REDD+. I 
draw relations mainly to Annelise Riles’ (2000) studies on NGO-work in Fiji when talking about 
the aesthetics of information, form and facts in the work of NGOs. 
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Chapter 5 is surrounding how the NGO shared information with villagers at the initial stages of the 
project, and gives some possible reasons as to why the NGOs chose to include the mechanism of 
FPIC at a later stage in the project. In relation to this it also considers why an aspect of the project, 
the land use planning, is late in the process of implementation.  
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 REDD+ in Tanzania 
 
There were several issues already resolved and set for REDD+ to be introduced in Tanzania prior to 
contract-agreement between the Norwegian Embassy and the Tanzania Forest Conservation Group 
on the 20th August 2009. There had been a major focus on improvements of environmental 
conditions in Tanzania, and the Vice Minister’s Office had already started developing a National 
Adaptation Programme of Action in cooperation with UNDP and UNEP in by 2007 to plan how 
they should approach the climate challenges. The Government formed a National REDD Task 
Force to plan and coordinate several issues at the national level before any of the organizations 
received an approval to start the project. In 2008, Tanzania and Norway signed a letter of intent for 
a Climate Change Partnership that involved piloting REDD+. The national aims and co-ordination 
in Tanzania already seemed to be moving in the right direction toward engaging REDD+ initiatives, 
but to what extent was REDD+ really ready to be implemented? 
In the previous chapter I elaborated on the basic overall and original idea of what REDD+ is within 
an international discourse. In this chapter, I look into some of the expectancies and uncertainties 
that were attached to the design of REDD+ among project proponents
9
 and national and 
international stakeholders. This I believe provides a necessary background to what the discourse 
about REDD+ is coming into in Tanzania. I give some insights as to how Tanzania, a quite arid 
country in comparison to several other countries that could be a fit for REDD+, was chosen for the 
project, how the idea has been “sold” to the Tanzanian stakeholders, and how it has been further 
elaborated in different forums. The purpose of this chapter is to show the visions and intentions 
behind REDD+ in Tanzania. It contains one empirical example from a workshop in Dar es Salaam, 
the UN-REDD Inception Workshop where both national and international representatives have been 
present. By using the idea of friction in several events to different times in different places, I seek to 
develop an understanding of how the content of REDD+ is diverging in local, national and 
international levels, and the dynamic processes where something is created. I also explore whether 
something new or different has emerged from what could be determined by the preconceptions in 
any of those given levels.
10
 This is also inspired by Latour’s (2005) arguments that a “network” is 
                                                 
9
 With the term ”project proponents” I mean the ones that have signed contracts with the Norwegian Embassy on behalf 
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (UD) to do REDD+ initiatives, whether they are representatives from the NGOs or 
the cooperating university institutions. 
10
 The way I use levels in this thesis is not in a hierarchical matter in the sense that decisions in one “higher level” has 
the power to control the “lower level”. Latour (2005) is saying that we have to flatten the landscape when talking about 
“networks” of relations, that we should talk about it two-dimensional instead of three-dimensional, or hierarchical. In 
this thesis I see the notion of levels besides each other, but flexible, so that in some situations at some times one level 
21 
 
confirmed by the meetings between actors, where something new from what was there in the 
beginning is created in the meeting. Although I am not adopting the notion of  “network” in this 
thesis, his work on interactions is still important here. 
 
 To Fly a Plane while Building It: International Aims 
 
Tanzania was one of the first three countries to develop a REDD+ National Programme together 
with Vietnam and Indonesia. Some questions have been raised and some speculations made as to 
why Tanzania was chosen in the first place, since there has been a general emphasis on the value of 
rainforests in what has been referred to as “major carbon sinks”, while there has been less focus on 
other types of forests, like the miombo woodland which covers about 96% of all forest in 
Tanzania.
11
    The two other types of forests that you can find are the lowland and montane forests 
(3%) and mangroves and plantations (1%) (URT 1998 cit. in Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011).
12
  
 The Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam is now administrating the funding for these 
REDD+ initiatives in Tanzania. In contact with the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they 
had told them that if they needed a pilot-country for REDD+ the Embassy had several contacts 
within the forest sector, which could be helpful in a development phase of the project. In addition, 
and as I have mentioned, there were several requirements that were already in place for Tanzania to 
become a pilot-country, but none of these were really linked to what has been the core of the 
REDD+ philosophy; the biophysical potential for carbon-sequestration and benefits from REDD+. 
As this chapter will show, there were only very small doubts to the belief that the potential in 
Tanzanian forest is much lower than in rainforests when it comes to storing carbon, and hence to get 
revenues from REDD+ in the way it is designed. The emphasis is rather put on the catastrophic 
scenario of how these areas around the Eastern Arc will be affected by climatic changes in the 
                                                                                                                                                                  
might move above the others in terms of displaying power, knowledge or agency, but might not stay there. Even though 
the chapter is divided in three parts based on three levels, the different discourses and perceptions are in reality floating 
slightly into each other. They are dynamic on cross and within each other, and also depending on the distribution of 
knowledge and what stakeholders are learning from each other. 
11
 Compared to 1988: According to Abdallah and Monela (2007), Ahlback gave a percentage of 90% of all tanzanian 
forested land area, which would constitute 44.6 mill. hectare at the time. 
12
 More numbers on the magnitude of forest and deforestation: According to Tanzania National Forest Programme 
2001–2010, about 38% of Tanzania’s 886 000 km2 total area is covered by forest and woodlands (URT, 2001). Zahabu 
and Malimbwi (2011) give a number of 35 million ha of Tanzanian forestland (which actually is a higher number than 
what was estimated within the Forest Programme) of which 18.3 million ha are reserved, and 17 ha are unprotected 
forests in general lands. About 412 000 ha a year is the estimated deforestation and degradation rate (Zahabu and 
Malimbwi, 2011), in general because of main-drivers like shifting agriculture, wildfires, illegal logging, mining, wood-
fuel extraction and large-scale farming of bio-fuel production (URT 2010). 
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future, a scenario that has been promoted in Tanzania by forest- and wildlife conservation NGOs for 
a long time, and for that reason they should be included in the project. Hence, the project would 
resonate with people’s opinions and perceptions towards risks, and therefore it would not be too 
difficult to get consent to go through with the project in Tanzania. The risks of climate change are 
put up against the risks of going through with the project. When talking about the latter, there are 
usually two groups that are mentioned: The first group that is taking risks is the funders of the 
project. To prevent them, a principle of zero tolerance for corruption is stipulated in the contracts 
between the Norwegian funder and the project proponent. The second group is the villagers, termed 
as indigenous people or local communities, together with the bio-physiological environment where 
they live. To prevent these risks, the decisions from the international negotiations in the COP 16 
conference affirms that safeguards should be promoted and supported in the initiatives, and this is 
considered a national responsibility (UNFCCC, 2010). 
In a publication by the International Institute for Environment and Development (IIED) emphasis is 
put on the necessity of doing REDD+ in so-called dryland forests, like the type that we can find in 
Tanzania, through what is termed a pro-poor approach. This is broadly defined as policies that are 
aimed at towards increasing “assets and capability of the poor” (Bond, et al., 2010, p. 53). As it is 
further explained, in defiance of the critique, that including issues like poverty and biodiversity is 
simply too much to address at once taken into consideration the urgent action that was needed 
through REDD+, “unless REDD+ is pro-poor in southern Africa it is unlikely to be successful 
because so much of the deforestation is being done by poor people.” (Bond et al., 2010, p. 53) The 
main thought is that REDD+ can provide a source of income to the local communities that can help 
them manage their resources more sustainably and efficiently, and that this can lead to a more 
secure living situation in the future. There is no doubt that this would be a dream-come-true, but the 
IIED publication is also mentioning another issue that makes us apprehensive – the issue of how the 
payments should be done. It suggests that most likely, the fund-based approach would be the best 
way, as “regulated markets are likely to involve larger financial flows, will be more focused on 
efficiency rather than equity and therefore targeted at major rainforest nations with high rates of 
deforestation such as Indonesia and Brazil.” (Bond et al., 2010, p. 52) In that way, as it is explained, 
it would not be generating as much money, but a fund-based approach would be more flexible and 
could signify fewer risks in Tanzania. Assumptions that I will get back to later, are that a “carbon 
only” focus can make Tanzania vulnerable at a competing market. This is an example of how the 
discourse is already starting to be about something else but payment for environmental services in 
the form of increasing carbon-sequestration at the national level. Moving closer towards the 
specificity of a pilot-project, the discourse is changing even more in the direction that the project 
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should be more about conservation and development concurrently, whereas the revenues from 
REDD+ are downplayed because of the insecurities surrounding carbon markets. What is in force is 
that everybody sees a road and can imagine a goal, but they do not know what challenges await 
them along the way, and sometimes whether they are picturing the same road with the same goal or 
not. These events where something new is adding up to the REDD+ discourse in Tanzania, I 
perceive them here as frictions. It shows here how other existing discourses of conservation and 
development in Tanzania are adding up to the discourse.  
My experience by following the project in Tanzania was that these frictions were not that easy to 
discover sometimes, and I believe that compared to other places where indigenous groups have 
shown clear reluctance in approving the project, the process has been closer to a “flow” in 
Tanzania, and the wheels have been turning really fast. This is not to say that Tanzania is the only 
place where stakeholders have not had the opportunity to see the whole scope of the project before 
implementation-phase. On the UN-REDD official web-pages in March 2010, after the three first 
inception-workshops had been held in Vietnam, Tanzania and Indonesia, an article of Chris Cosslett 
– an independent consultant engaged in UN-REDD with experience in formulating international 
environmental projects – gave an impression that things were rolling a bit fast. A wide range of 
questions and uncertainties had emerged from different parts during these workshops, and the 
article gave stakeholders an invitation to pause and remind themselves what the intention was really 
supposed to be grounded in the UN-REDD National Programmes.
13
   
 
… it may be worth pausing to reflect on the meaning of these events. They are in fact important 
moments marking each country’s entry into the emerging international REDD+ regime and, indeed, 
in the emergence of the regime itself. …UN-REDD Programme pilot NPs are among the first efforts 
to take a systemic, national-level approach to the many challenges of national-level “REDD 
readiness.” And while the international community continues its efforts—see Copenhagen, Paris, 
Oslo, etc.—to fully construct that regime, national governments, with support from the UN-REDD 
Programme, are wasting no time, in the hopes of being ready for REDD+… when REDD+ is ready 
for them.  
(Cosslett, 2010) 
 
His last comments imply certain scepticism towards the fact that the project is in such a hurry that 
there is no time to make sure that the countries themselves are actually ready for the challenges of 
integrating REDD+ in the national politics. He ends the article with the last sentence that reflects a 
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 These workshops were part of the process of developing the National Programs. 
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touch of cynicism, that despite all the uncertainties, he gives the signal for starting – now that the 
ball is already rolling: “So sound the gong and let the National Programmes begin!” (Cosslett, 
2010) 
UN-REDD Inception Workshop, 29.01.2010 
This was my very first meeting with negotiations in the development aid-business in its most 
common forum – the workshop. I was sweaty after spending the last 45 minutes in the traffic-jam in 
a taxi without air-conditioning, nervous, as I was late because of the jam and I thought the trip 
would be shorter; because I had no idea what kind of people I would meet; and unsure of what this 
“workshop-concept” was all about. I rushed into the hotel-lobby and found three Europeans that 
seemed like they were going to a conference as well. I later learned we were going to the same 
meeting, and I realized that I overestimated the need to be on time for a Tanzanian workshop as we 
entered the empty conference-room – the others arrived during the next hour.  They were 
representatives from the Government, the newly established National REDD Task Force, the United 
Nations, the Norwegian Embassy, Sokoine University of Agriculture (SUA) in Morogoro and 
piloting NGOs. The purpose of the workshop was to exchange opinions about the REDD+ project 
in Tanzania and to plan the first phase of the project by presenting a UN work-plan. The vantage 
point for the work-plan was the four outcomes that had been developed in the program document 
for Tanzania, which was presented to the UN-REDD Policy Board in March 2009 with some 
elaborations on what has to be done on different levels to fulfill the outcomes.  
In the following I will explain this meeting as a case of social interface, an analytical framework 
developed by Norman Long (2001) “for depicting organizing practices and processes of 
knowledge/power construction”. This was a workshop where several REDD+ stakeholders in Dar 
es Salaam were participating, and where different perceptions of REDD+ were presented.
14
 Long 
says that we should not have the idea that knowledge and power is something that can be possessed 
by people, but it is context-based. It does not mean that if someone has knowledge or power others 
do not, because they emerge out of social interaction, and are not unquestionable givens that remain 
the same for all the parties. It is the struggle over the right to define and to include other people 
within one’s project by making them change their points of view that would generate power. He 
says that the actor-oriented approach in small-scale interactional settings are crucial to understand 
emergent structures and contexts, and suggests some tools for analysis; “to identify and characterize 
differing actor practices, strategies, and rationales, the conditions under which they arise, how they 
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 At this stage no one knew where in the country that the projects would be implemented. No people from rural 
communities were represented. 
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interlock, their viability or effectiveness for solving specific problems, and their wider social 
ramifications” (Long, 2001, p. 20). I have decided to not use the concept of “power” as something 
that is crucial for my analysis, what is crucial, is to illuminate those “emergent structures” Long is 
talking about, as it would in this analysis be about the emergence of a REDD+ discourse in 
Tanzania. 
In an effort to try to characterize practices, strategies and rationales I would like to compare the 
interaction during this interface-encounter with a “seller/buyer” situation, a situation where the 
issue of power is dynamic, bidirectional, elaborated and not quite set. I do this only to describe the 
type of interaction during the workshop, not to say that it was actually about taking the offer of 
REDD – but in some way the negotiations were still going on, and therefore one could sense a 
certain kind of anxiety mainly between the Government people, one post doc. from SUA, and the 
representatives from UN. The representatives from TFCG and MJUMITA were not engaging very 
much in the debate, but were rather working as mediators between the main other main parties. 
One would maybe think that the Tanzanian Government representatives would take the “seller-role” 
as the country will be selling their services of improved carbon sequestration. Meanwhile the UN-
representatives should be representing the “carbon-buyers”. However, the situation brought to the 
surface during the meeting was that the UN-representatives are to a greater extent resembling the 
ones that are disseminating notions about rich countries that are offering to buy the carbon. In this 
way all of them – the two Scandinavian men and the Tanzanian woman – were all acting similar to 
sales people, the non-aggressive type, smart and fairly convincing, with no visible form of pressure 
– acting as if it was they that had a really good offer and several potential buyers, so many that it 
does not really matter whether you take the offer or not, as if they were doing you a favour. One can 
assume that it is just a farce, taken the time and progress of the project into consideration, it was 
necessary that the offer be taken. The real situation between the different parties indicated that the 
offer had already been taken. The UN representatives had quite a lot of confidence since the 
preparations for REDD+ were already processing, and envisioning the opportunity that the project 
could amount to in the sense of development in Tanzania, which leads to the question of whether 
there was a way the Government would say no to this source of money? In some way it seemed that 
some representatives from the Government would like to, or they would like to show more agency. 
It became obvious that they felt buyer’s pressure as one representative from the Vice President’s 
Office stated: “Sometimes I just have to ask why other people have to tell us what to do!” The 
governmental “buyers” were sceptical, and wanted to know everything about the “product” before 
going any further with the bargaining.  This was also the case among the academic representatives. 
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One professor’s statement was: “This work-plan has not got enough details. I need the details before 
we move on”.  
The people from the UN were polite while explaining their case, still keeping their authority by 
using facial gestures like raising their eyebrows, panning and peeking above their glasses. They 
explained to the partakers in the meeting that they were there to listen to their opinions and thoughts 
about how REDD might work out in Tanzania. Comments from this side of the table were; “We are 
trying to fly a plane while we are building it. We depend on having the village-communities’ trust 
to succeed.” This statement came after stories about unwelcome projects in Uganda, and show the 
transparent way of talking about how uncertain the project is. In response to sceptical comments to 
the work-plan, people from the UN explained that the work-plan was actually prepared in Tanzania, 
and there was no reason for people to think that it would be a blueprint.  
While going through the work-plan, one post doc. from one of the Tanzanian universities was 
constantly arguing that nearly all the outputs were already covered, and there was basically nothing 
new to accomplish that they came up with in the work-plan. This took a lot of time without really 
opening up for a discussion about the different points, and I could recognize that at least one of the 
UN representatives that was taking notes from the workshop started to loose his patience. 
The reason why the post doc had the opinion that all the outputs were already covered, was that he, 
as well as many other stakeholders within the project, had come to the conclusion that all the project 
was about was to continue the same kinds of PFM-activities that they had done already, and then 
the money from REDD+ would come as something extra that would not really mean anything new 
in the form of new institutions, implementation-strategies or anything else. He did also say that he 
thought there was no piloting going on, and that they had already tested these projects through the 
present PFM-projects. What he obviously wanted to underpin was that there is hardly anything new 
about REDD+ in Tanzania. The response to this from one of the UN representatives was that “this 
is only true if we assume that we already have the best solution. To me, that is not the best way to 
advance.” This shows the oppositions and divergences in views that I argue is what Long is talking 
about as preconditions for social interface-encounters, and what came out of the situation was that 
the UN people finally got him and maybe other attendants enrolled into their project, as this 
comment made them realize that the project might be about other issues than what was anticipated. 
The Government was also offensive and asked critical questions. At this point the level of 
knowledge about the project was a bit higher among the UN staff than with the Government, but the 
Tanzanian representatives, like any other potential buyer, wanted to give the impression that there 
was nothing to the project that they themselves needed, so as to “lower the price” in terms of loss of 
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independency and agency, which is often the high price that has to be paid when one enters into 
agreements for development projects. In these matters the REDD+ project might not become very 
different from other development projects. 
I experienced that several Tanzanian stakeholders had either the opinion that REDD+ was “nothing 
new”, or they thought it was diffuse in the way that it was very difficult to really know what 
REDD+ contains. Everybody knew that it intended to pay people for conserving the forest or using 
the forest in a non-destructive way, which can increase the carbon sequestration, but since there are 
so many unknowns in terms of payments, leakage-management and monitoring, many people were 
concerned that it did not seem to contain anything different from what had been practiced through 
PFM. As one officer from a cooperating Ugandan organization said: “Besides the money there’s 
nothing new to REDD. I’m worried that there is too little talk about money since that is really what 
REDD is all about.” She meant that the mechanisms that REDD+ is based on in Tanzania through 
PFM are already there, and that the money to the people in the villages should be more at stake. She 
explained her doubts if the money from selling carbon-quotes would be enough for the people 
considering the loss of freedom regarding land-resources, and said that; “we are testing REDD+ 
now in the communities, but I ask whether it is even worth testing. To what prize, and on what 
people’s behalf are we doing this?”  She was then touching upon another important question in 
relation to the REDD+ activities going on at the present stage – whether the emphasis on piloting 
REDD+ is genuine, since the general opinion seemed to be that the differences between REDD+ 
and PFM were small, more important is it to consider the consequences for the villages where a sort 
of testing is done – whether they would be more or less the same if we did not use the term “pilot”.  
In one of the later chapters I would like to take these statements into consideration as I elaborate on 
ideas about how people make decisions to go further in the process of REDD+ implementation to 
different stages by making an analysis on how terms and discourses are made to legalize the 
process. At all stages there are a lot of doubts, and sometimes these doubts are expressed, 
sometimes they are covered by terms like “lessons learnt” and “pilot project”. 
 A Package in Our Country: National Aims 
 
“REDD is a package in our country” – the statement was made by a representative from the 
National Task Force during the Inception Workshop in January 2010 described in the previous part. 
The meaning behind this was not clearly expressed, but taken different dictionary-definitions of the 
word package into consideration, like “a finished product contained in a unit that is suitable for 
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immediate installation and operation … or a group, combination, or series of related parts or 
elements to be accepted or rejected as a single unit”, I think in this context REDD+ could be 
translated as a multi-level solution made by external agents adapted to fit not only one specific 
recipient, but several.  
Despite the “show-off” through claims of agency during the workshop I have been describing, there 
were no realistic way that people from the Government would raise significant resistance towards 
the project, and neither was this the forum for decision-making, it was only an introduction to the 
project where information-sharing and exchange of opinions took place. REDD+ could comprise a 
major opportunity for Tanzania in terms of funding and other income. What seems to be different 
from other kinds of development-programs is that this time the Government is given a kind of 
responsibility that is containing close cooperation with NGOs as well as international stakeholders. 
In conversation with one stakeholder at the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Dar es Salaam, the 
perception of how different REDD+ is to other projects is due to the fact that Tanzania has to show 
measurable results that would not allow for corruption in the long run, which strengthens 
transparency. When I went back to Dar es Salaam in 2011 I also found that there had been pressure 
put on the Government from TNRF (Tanzania Natural Resource Forum), which had criticized it in 
the newspaper Guardian for not making the REDD+ National Strategy official. During a debate at 
the British Council one of the representatives from the REDD+ National Task Force made it clear 
that the document was now official, whereas a representative from an environmental organization 
also said that there was “no use of confronting each other when we are all working for the same 
pro-poor project”. This was a common way of calming down debates that I met under several 
circumstances, and it could also prevent the positive effects of friction. Even though the goal that he 
spoke about would be somewhat similar, pressure and debates create energy for new ideas and 
insights. Frictions should be producing energy to the development discourse in Tanzania. To put it 
in one former Embassy Counsellor’s way of seeing it: “The Government is not used to meet the 
public, and to see the positive aspects and potential for improvements that lies in criticism.” 
In the debate I recognized that a new group of people that I would say constitutes new stakeholders 
had appeared. This is the audience that is being reached through media, beyond the group of 
researchers, students, journalists and environmentalists. The first time I came to Tanzania very few 
people knew about REDD+, as was expected. This time I understood that the organizations and 
other stakeholders had been emphasizing the promotion of the project through media. I found that 
the TFCG had been the initiators of a video-production on REDD+, there were articles in the paper 
specifically concerning REDD+, and a debate on REDD+ at the British Council was arranged 
through TNRF which was open for anybody that was interested. As I attended this debate, my 
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impression was that compared to previous meetings surrounding REDD+, more critical voices 
became apparent in this one. The group beyond stakeholders wanted to know how the payments 
would be done, how we can assure that women will be represented, how land-rights and incentives 
to people in the villages will be guaranteed. As one gentleman stated; “we need to be sure of this!” 
Questions were starting to turn from “if” towards “how”. There was a statement from a woman in 
the audience that alleged land-grab as a component of the project. A young man raised questions to 
the effect of whether urban planning in his town would also do some good, and thereby decreasing 
the pollution instead of troubling the poor people in the villages. A western man, or commonly 
called mzungu,
15
 confirmed that this breakfast-debate was certainly not a debate in the sense that 
they were for instance contesting issues of “nested approach” versus “national funding”. He claimed 
that it only consisted of already established statements and assumptions of how REDD+ should be 
done through a nested approach. “These are things we have to discuss”, he said. A lot of 
engagement was uncovered during this meeting, and these questions being put at stake 
demonstrated to me a variety of perceptions to the project that had not been so openly uttered in 
those small, national forum that I had been attending earlier. It shows how public debates can be 
important to create sufficient frictions, so that for instance common assumptions on what are the 
best solutions are not automatically applied onto an existing system. That would be what Latour 
terms a complex intermediate – the discourse is not adding anything to itself. 
What can the overall national goal for this project be? I am not even sure if there originally was any 
strong national engagement in this, since the primer engagement came from the Norwegian 
Embassy, and the funding went directly to the organizations. In the same debate at the British 
Council one of the participants also asked whether there generally was a problem of low 
engagement from the Government’s side. This could be true, since it does not seem like the REDD+ 
payments for carbon-quotes are going to take the route through national authorities easily.  
Besides the matter of funding, it is clear that there has been a priority from the Government’s side 
to map and manage as much land as possible under the two different versions of PFM.
16
 Roderick 
P. Neumann (2005) gives a short history of the governmental interests in this by referring to the 
African continent as a whole, but specifically emphasizing Tanzania and Zimbabwe. He explains 
African populations’ resistance in colonial times towards the displacements forced on them by 
European settlers who were working towards creating naturalized landscapes of protected areas. To 
enhance the situation created and correct the past injustices towards local concerns, programs like 
CBNRM and Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP) were developed to involve 
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 Mzungu is a common term among Tanzanians, which mainly refers to a person with white/caucasian skin-color. 
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 See the introduction for more details on PFM. 
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the local communities in the management of the resources. Neumann writes of an early version of 
CBNRM in the colonial Tanganyika’s system – the Native Authority Forest Reserves, where 
responsibilities of protection were delegated to Native Authorities who were working through 
indirect rule, and where all the benefits would go back to the Native Authorities. He argues that the 
new programs were not really a break with the tendency of spatial segregation of nature and society 
during colonial times, because “local participation and local benefit sharing … are not the same as 
local power to control use and access.” (Neumann, 2005, p. 190) These projects could be designed 
not to improve livelihoods, but to defuse local opposition.  
In the same way as CBNRM could be understood as part of indirect rule in colonial times, 
Neumann argues that recent programs can also be seen in relation to the larger political and 
economic processes going on that are encompassing most of the continent. The most significant one 
that he mentions is the Structural-Adjustment Programs and its neoliberal philosophy which puts 
pressure on governments to promote privatization, and also the privatization of land that evicts 
customary rights. Most African countries have tried to develop these more modern forms of land-
tenure with the vision that it would increase the levels of agricultural production due to higher 
investments. The idea is also applied to conservation-policy and CBNRM projects – that firm land-
ownership will make it easier to secure conservation. Neumann is sceptical to this kind of thinking 
about tenure, and refers to case studies that show contradictory results. These Structural-Adjustment 
Programs have also had major influence on what the Government can provide for rural education 
and health care. As the Government has increasingly become legitimized due to what it can deliver 
in the form of jobs and services, they have given rural communities less precedence. Hence 
CBNRM and similar projects implemented by different kinds of organizations can sometimes go 
through with the work that the Government is no longer prioritizing, and in that way those 
organizations function as elongations of the Government. 
In addition to the argument of firm landownership through CBNRM as the best way of securing 
conservation, Skutsch and McCall (2011) is also highlighting some advantages through CFM: “The 
community gains by no longer living in conflict with forest officials, and by the increasing health 
and productivity of the forest; the state gains because this kind of management is often quite 
effective, and much cheaper and easier than protecting the forest by force.” (Skutsch and McCall, 
2011, p. 5) 
Without going in depth, I would also like to mention another way of understanding the national 
interests in REDD+. According to Zahabu and Malimbwi (2011), REDD+ could potentially be a 
part of the contribution to the international Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) of 
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environmental sustainability and rural poverty reduction to 50% from 1990 to 2015. Here the 
definition of poverty utilized is having an income of less than US$1 per day per head. In Tanzania, 
the MDG on poverty reduction became part of the National Strategy for Growth and Reduction of 
Poverty (NSGRP) with a more ambitious hope of fulfilling it within 2010.  
 Focusing on “Lessons Learnt”: NGOs Aims 
 
Heidi: What was the reason why TFCG and MJUMITA signed the REDD contract in the 
first place?  
Technical Advisor of TFCG: Yes, good question. Essentially – because TFCG has been 
working with communities and forest conservation for the last 25 years, we’ve seen some 
patterns emerging. I think – number one, we’ve seen that getting communities involved in 
forest conservation is a good thing. They are good forest managers, provided sufficient 
training and so on. But, the other pattern we saw was that the cash income was quite low for 
people.  And that was providing challenges to the communities, natural resource 
communities, in terms of getting in money to carry on doing this hard work actually, so 
we’ve kind of seen that pattern. I guess we’re also seeing this pattern is growing actually 
worse, so wanting to find ways to provide full time incomes which are actually good for the 
society as well as covering those costs. We saw some success within side the butterfly-
project, so we have seen where, you know, livelihood activities outside of the forest change 
people’s behavior in terms of forest management. When we started hearing about REDD it 
seemed clear that there was an opportunity there for the communities, but that they needed 
to get organized. Their weakness is that they are not organized; they don’t have the technical 
capacity to engage in the debate and therefore engage themselves so that they can be not just 
kind of trailing along the highway, but can sit in the driver-seat. So, at the same time TFCG 
has been supporting this community forestry conservation network MJUMITA since 
2000/2001. And again, that network kind of needed the role and the message which was 
coming out from the communities and went back to their livelihoods. So the two things kind 
of matched. And it was from there that we got the idea of organizing with MJUMITA in 
such a way that it could be a channel whereby individual communities could benefit from 
REDD and access REDD and engage in the debate on REDD … 
… Communities would get low income from PFM – they were not getting very much 
money. Particularly from high biodiversity areas where there wasn’t much potential for 
logging and so on, so they were doing a lot of work, and they were not necessarily getting 
very much money for it. While the projects are there they can in some way subsidize it, but 
in the longer run there needs to be other sources of income, and then relatively REDD being 
the only source of income we still, we don’t wanna put all our eggs in one pot, in other 
means we still wanna carry on with butterfly-farming and general environment raising and 
all the other things we’ve been doing but this REDD is particularly attractive because it adds 
an amount of cash which can pay for all the hard work and I mean money buys you 
flexibility even for the institutional things … 
… How much individuals can get? Yeah, we kind of worked out rough figures per hectare; I 
mean it’s not a huge amount of money when you break it down per capita. So that’s why in 
a way I think that it’s important to put it in a context of other activities; you don’t wanna 
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throw all the other things out. And only focus on REDD or even emphasize too much the 
financial elements. 
Heidi: Somebody gave me a number of 10 dollars a year per person?  
TA: There are so many variables in it. That actually we still have to work that out and 
evaluate it from side to side – it depends on population density, it depends on carbon 
density, it depends on what is the historical deforestation-rate is, it depends on how well you 
can measure it. So there are a lot of unknowns. But there’s not gonna be huge money, no. 
--- 
Heidi: What kind of income do you think that communities could be likely to generate 
through REDD? 
Technical Advisor, MJUMITA: It’s totally up in the air. Nobody knows. Because there is a 
lot of different variables in place, and one is how much deforestation do you think that we 
are preventing, and that transits into the amount of carbon you are saving and the value of 
the market. The other thing also is that it depends on where REDD stays, so like at the 
moment, you know under the official climate agreements like the Clean Development 
Mechanism and all that, the only thing that counts is reforestation, so that you can do REDD 
and there have been done plenty of REDD projects before this, but that has been on a 
voluntary basis, so the price that you get for carbon on a voluntary market would be 
significantly lower than what would be available in a regulatory market. So in 2012, if we 
come together and people say yes, let’s make REDD part of the global climate agreement, 
that could significantly increase the value like maybe 3 or 4 times ... 
… I think that there are some risks that you are going to find that is particularly challenging 
in Tanzania, because the highest rates of deforestation are actually in areas that are fairly dry 
forest which are such low carbon forests, so the actual value might not be that high. And as a 
country maybe you find that there are other countries where you have higher carbon-forests, 
they have maybe been deforested maybe for some time, maybe for agriculture or something 
like that, but it might be more economical to do that agriculture someplace else under 
REDD. And maybe that will be in places where you have lower carbon forest, you know, 
such as Tanzania, so REDD can actually displace deforestation from areas where you have 
high carbon-forest to places where you have low carbon-forest. And from what I’ve seen 
Tanzania has got, I mean, we have high carbon-forests here, but that is not the places that is 
being cut down. It’s mostly the low-carbon forest that is being cut down so that is also going 
to affect how much income people are going to get and whether this whole thing is going to 
work. 
Heidi: What you’re saying is that you don’t think Tanzania is suitable for piloting REDD? 
TA: I was surprised when they were like, like… you know! Indonesia, yeah makes great 
sense! Tanzania? I don’t know! We’ll see. There are montane forest too, and coastal forests, 
the coastal forests might work because there you have some kind of medium amount of 
carbon and some places very high deforestation rate. But most places in Tanzania is just dry 
miombo, you know, probably about 40 tonnes of carbon per ha. You know, and if it could be 
irrigated or some way of farming it, it would probably be a better opt to go than just trying 
to save this REDD forest. But we’ll see! 
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By introducing this part with the excerpts of the two interviews, I want to show the ambivalence in 
the TFCG / MJUMITA visions for the project. At the same time as it is perceived as a considerable 
opportunity for payments to local communities, the assumptions are also that there will probably 
not be much payment at all. Zahabu and Malimbwi (2011) is also emphasizing the same issues and 
reasons for these issues: “Whether placing PFM under a REDD+ regime would result in reductions 
of rural poverty as a result of payments to communities for the credits depends essentially on the 
price of carbon on the international market, and the proportion of that price which would be made 
over to local communities.” (Zahabu and Malimbwi, 2011) They have estimated the opportunity 
cost per household under REDD+ project to be between US$3.20 – US$12.20 a year when 
management and implementation costs, transaction costs are taken into consideration. This is not 
enough to replace any present subsistence- or economic sphere for anybody living in the villages. 
They also mentioned that there are risks of elite captures. I did those interviews in February 2010, 
and the prospects for REDD+ in Tanzania on the carbon market has not changed very much two 
years later. Prospects at the international level have also changed, as the discourse has started to 
move towards an understanding that there might not be created a carbon market specifically for 
REDD+ after all. 
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 Local Settings 
 
REDD+ initiatives intend to compensate indigenous people and local communities which live in 
selected forested areas for their contribution to sustainable forest management. Poverty levels have 
led to the vulnerability of people and environment. In many of these areas stakes are high, 
considering the risks related to the project, which threaten the forest and the inhabitants of its 
surrounding villages.  
 
The risks and opportunities that REDD may raise for [Indigenous People] and [Local Communities] 
include, on the one hand, potential loss of access to land and other natural resources, and on the other 
hand, potentially increased resource flows to poor rural areas and improved forest governance. 
Effective participation of [Indigenous People] and [Local Communities] in REDD implementation 
would increase the likelihood that their risks will be mitigated and their opportunities enhanced.  
(Angelsen et al., 2009, p. ix) 
 
This citation includes what I would say is the perceived main risk as opposed to the main 
opportunity of REDD+ in the very “simplest” form of the international REDD+ discourse, in 
addition to the “simple” solution to doubts about including local participation. There are several 
other risks, some of them I will come back to in the last section of this chapter. There are two other 
aims for this chapter. The first is to give a presentation of the village setting where REDD+ were to 
be implemented. This is crucial for my later chapters that surrounds how these villages were 
selected, and gives a basic impression for why I propose that it is important to know quite a lot 
about the village setting before implementing any projects. The second aim for the chapter is 
reflected in the citation above, and has something to do with an expression by Riles (2000), the 
“opacity of facts”. The way I understand it, is that this can be an opposite or a threat to the 
transparency of information. What she gives a thorough account of with this expression, is how one 
takes for granted that facts are reality, whereas the reality is much more complex “… as statements 
that mask the true complexity of information and the reality of political contention.” (Riles, 2000, p. 
139) I suggest that the quotation above is one example of this, where one assumes that the people in 
question are either indigenous people or local communities. In Tanzania, the last term is the one that 
has been commonly used when talking about the populations of rural areas. I argue that the term 
should be reflected upon.  
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Village – Local Settings for Project Implementation 
 
Ibingu and Lunenzi – the two villages  where I spent my last three months during fieldwork – are 
situated on the mid-western part of Kilosa district, two hours walk from the boarder of the Dodoma 
region. They used to be one village until year 2000, but because of high migration into the part of 
Ibingu that is now called Lunenzi, they found it necessary to have two separate village 
governments, and thereby decided to split the village through the natural topography of a mountain 
ridge which stretches in each direction towards the boundary markers that define the borders of the 
surrounding villages. All the information that I have about the area from earlier times is based on 
stories told by the villagers, as there is no written history to be found about this area. Ibingu was 
registered as a village in 1974, as part of the comprehensive villagization, but there have been 
people living there since before this formalization – 1907 was the earliest date of establishment 
according to some of the elders who told me that a few members of the Sagara-tribe had been living 
there since then. Old beliefs about spirits residing in the forest were inherited from them.
17
 People 
had been more spread out back than as compared to now. Starting in 1974, members of the Hehe- 
and Gogo-tribes arrived and started cultivating the same land. Today the same three tribes are living 
there, but other people occasionally immigrate or stay for a season or longer while they are renting a 
piece of a plot or selling local beer.  
Ibingu is a beautiful valley densely inhabited in some parts by houses or utilized for cultivating 
fields, of maize and beans. Another considerable part of the valley consists of bush-and grassland. 
The village is situated close to the road between Kilosa town and Dodoma. It takes three hours to go 
by motorbike from Kilosa town to Ibingu, the only vehicles that can manage these roads except for 
trucks and Landrovers. The neighbouring village, Lunenzi, has only got walking-paths, and there 
had been no attempts to build roads in the rugged environment at the time I was there. To get there 
from Ibingu primary school takes about two hours on foot, and is daily trip for Lunenzi children 
who were able to attend. Lunenzi has an amazingly rugged and beautiful landscape of farming-plots 
patchworked and houses constructed on top of every hill. A dense evergreen forest lines the 
mountain ridges that surrounds the village, which functions as a catchment forest, and is efficient in 
                                                 
17
 There is a belief that a certain bamboo-area called Mianzini in the forest is hunted by spirits. As I visited this place I 
was told to be careful not to say, not even think about, something bad or evil at all, but keep positive thoughts even 
though the path was slippery and steep. If not, the belief is that the person will get lost in the forest as a result of the 
spirits playing a trick on him or her. Since they kept this belief in the villages, it could be a way to conserve the bamboo 
area. I did not get this confirmed, I only experienced that there was a certain laugh about it. One old man from Lunenzi 
said that it was only when people went alone in the forest that they came with mysterious stories afterwards, so he did 
not know if he could believe them. 
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preventing erosion and securing stabile water-flows. The soil here is very fertile, and many people 
from Ibingu still have their farms in this part of the old village-unit. The farmers do not need to do 
shifting cultivation to the extent that is common in most of the Kilosa district because of this 
fertility. Instead they have a more systematic use of the same plots for different kinds of crops and 
at different time of the year. The people of Ibingu said, that during the rainy season they were 
completely dependent on the plots in Lunenzi and on the mountains bordering it. At this time the 
soil down in Ibingu valley can be too over-tilled to handle the large amount of water pouring down, 
so that crops are washed away with it. I experienced the sight of this as I went back to the villages 
in February 2011, all the crops down in the valley were destroyed, some fragile houses had been 
completely decimated, and some inhabitants looked thinner and gaunter than before. 
I consider a description as simple as this to give the sufficient basis for this thesis in understanding 
the poverty level and vulnerability among the people living in the village. Although they might be 
generally more fortunate than people living in less fertile areas, people here are vulnerable, and 
some are more exposed to hunger than others, depending on their age and abilities for cultivating 
relations. 
Alcohol Consumption 
In this rough context one finds a lot of alcoholism. This is nothing peculiar for these villages 
compared to other rural areas in the country, and several anthropological works surrounding 
Tanzania and other African countries have put the issue forward (Snyder, 2005, Talle, 1995, Willis, 
2006). Beer does for some people serve the same purpose as a meal, and therefore the expression 
“kula pombe!” – which in this setting means “eat beer!”18 – is often uttered while offering 
somebody a sip of the plastic-tankard. True enough, it is made out of exactly the same ingredients 
as what is commonly used for the porridge that is eaten every day called ugali, which consists of 
maize-flour and water. Many social activities are tied to the consumption of local beer, but the 
frequency of this is a bit different between the two villages where I stayed due to their topography 
and location. Ibingu is the most “central” one, located near the road, it has its own tiny little market 
with the popular “kilabuni”19  – a square building with a cassette-reader that plays Tanzanian gospel 
music. Here people sit down to drink “pombe”. There are also areas for selling fresh meat, a woman 
                                                 
18
 The correct translation of pombe is alcohol, and it is more common to have a specific name on the type of local beer 
made other places. 
19
 Kilabuni” means ”in the club”, and originates most likely from this same English phrase. 
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baking “mandazis” and “chapatis”20 for sale, and there are small stores containing staples like 
vegetables, soaps, salt, dried fish, matches, cooking-oil and kerosene. Lunenzi has not got a centre 
like this. Notably, one of the perhaps positive effects from this is less consumption of beer in 
Lunenzi. In Ibingu the women cook at least two barrels of pombe every day, three on Sundays and 
on special occasions. In Lunenzi they only cook every second day, and one has to consider the 
“kazi”21 to traverse the distance and difficult paths to the place where the beer is sold that day.22 I 
believe this was a significant cause to the appearance of fewer quarrels and conflicts in Lunenzi, 
compared to all the violence that was part and parcel to the club in the neighbouring village of 
Ibingu.  
The different degrees of alcohol consumption were noted by me as well as the TFCG field-officers. 
It had some implications for their initial presence in the villages, in terms of cooperation and 
engagement. One of the officers also claimed that the villagers were more “polite” in Lunenzi than 
in the other village, where there was more “aggressiveness” attached to beer consumption. 
According to a group of three elders from Ibingu it had been the reason as to why people did not 
trust each other in the same way as back in the days before villagization, when people were living 
more scattered. At that time, they explained, people had been cooking beer for their own family, not 
for sale, and therefore it was not always accessible because of the time it takes to cook it. Willis 
(2006, pp. 6-7) writes about how alcohol-consumption grew with the establishments of towns, 
never as traditionally reciprocal elements, but as sales-elements. The information I got from the 
elders show that the sale of beer was similarly established with smaller “centralizations” in villages, 
or villagizations. At the same time as one should keep in mind that the sale of beer is the most 
important source of income for women in the villages, the moderation of this in Lunenzi served as 
the social interaction, and engendered sustainability, of a peaceful communal feeling. In writing 
about rural development among the Iraqw in northern Tanzania, Katherine A. Snyder (2005, p. 130) 
points out that many people she had been talking to perceive alcohol as the biggest social problem 
and the reason for development to falter in the area. High alcohol-consumption is not an uncommon 
phenomenon in rural areas at all, but as I have described, there are differences between villages, and 
therefore a careful selection of cooperating partner-villages could be an advantage for the feasibility 
of the project.  
                                                 
20
 Mandazi is a cake made out of wheat flour, sugar, water and baking powder and fried in a lot of cooking oil, similar 
to doughnuts. Chapati is made out of wheat flour, oil, salt, water and sometimes butter, and fried like a tortilla. 
21
 Kazi means work. To walk a long distance is often perceived as kazi in the sense of struggle. 
22
 There are different women cooking each day in the month. One has to apply for a licence to cook at the VEO’s 
office. 
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Land Tenure 
Accumulation of land in Ibingu and Lunenzi happens simply through clearing it. Since Ibingu was 
registered as a village in 1974 there has been one important regulation to follow regarding land-
distribution, and that is to not clear the land against the dense forest on the mountain-ridges towards 
Lunenzi. This is to prevent forest fires and deforestation through the clearing of land. The rule has 
become less respected in the recent years, and according to the chairman of Ibingu there have also 
been some troubles with people coming from other villages who are not respecting the law. Some 
people also claimed that payments to the village leaders for permission to clear happened to 
frequently. 
According to the information from the representatives of the two village counsels in Ibingu and 
Lunenzi, the villages have been registered in the district, but they said that they have no legal rights 
to the land and the forest there. The villages were, at the time I was there, situated at so-called 
“general land”, which is understood as all public land, and is neither reserved nor village land. The 
type of land is regulated under the Land Act together with the “reserved land” which is land set 
apart for national parks, game reserves, forest reserves, marine parks and public recreation parks. 
“Village land” is owned by the village itself, and is regulated by the Village Land Act, which was 
adopted in 1999. (Barume, 2011, p. 145)  
TFCG field-officers were surprised that the land in the area was not village land. They told the 
villagers that they were going to help them get the legal rights to their land, but later explained to 
me that it would take some time due to slow processes at district level, and also that it would 
include some more expenditures. The last thing I heard surrounding this theme from the senior staff 
in TFCG, was that it did not matter so much whether it was general land or not – there could be a 
parallel rights-system that defined the owners of the revenues from carbon sequestration that did not 
interfere with the present land-rights. A leaflet published quite recently by the organization on 
REDD+ rights (See annex 2) problematizes the issues of land-rights and revenues, which can be a 
signal that these issues are still not completely under control by the project proponents. The positive 
aspect of this is that it shows the organization’s concrete efforts of agency and accountability, and 
several of their publications and leaflets are emphasizing similar issues that are important for 
making the project work for the people living in these villages.
23
  The challenge is usually to 
communicate the villagers needs in an effective way, so that stakeholders at national and 
international levels are pushed to legislate rules that are benefiting rural population. 
                                                 
23
 See the publications in pdf. versions here: http://www.tfcg.org/makingReddWork.html 
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I should add here that there was a lot of positive interaction in the villages. The children would 
learn very early how to help out both at home and for other families. If one saw somebody was 
working, like a woman outside her house preparing food, it was a common gesture for anybody to 
stop by and help out a bit, instead of passing directly. The woman selling mandazis would 
sometimes add another extra. The children would be sharing their sugarcane with each other. 
Leaving the children back home for the neighbor to look after them was never a problem.  
The purpose in presenting the villages by emphasizing a high consumption of alcohol and their little 
effective prescriptions for attachment and ownership to land, is not because of a malicious intent, 
but serves mainly two important objectives for this thesis. One is that it shows some of the types of 
challenges that the NGOs have encountered as national NGOs that are not attached to the specific 
area. Other sites I have visited where the NGOs have been working for several years, where they 
already know the people and the environment, they seemed to have trust among the villagers, and 
hence agency in promoting the project in the villages is amplified. I would say that it is perhaps not 
surprising that TFCG / MJUMITA would meet more challenges in initial stages of project 
implementation. An example of a challenge they have met, an outbreak of friction, is that they have 
been delayed because they had to start over again with a process of land use planning in the 
villages. This means that different areas that belong to the villages are mapped and divided into 
sectors of different utilization, for instance areas for harvesting firewood, farming, beekeeping and 
grazing. This was still going on in autumn 2011 because of miscommunication between NGO-staff 
and villagers, where the villagers thought that areas had been put off for full conservation, not for 
management. According to NGO staff, this was an incorrect perception. 
The second objective was to create grounds for what I will discuss further in the next part of this 
chapter; the problems in these cases regarding the conceptualizations of the target communities for 
revenues from REDD+. Using the term “community” to address the target group for revenues and 
project management within REDD+ in Tanzania has been a given within the international and 
national discourse. In the next part, I want to look into how this is attached to the notion that 
cohesion; solidarity and common agency are strong enough in these “communities” to stand 
together in the introduction of an external project. Indeed, the TFCG Technical Advisor said in the 
excerpt from the interview cited in chapter 2, that a problem is often that these people are not 
organized well enough, so they are “trailing along the highway”. Referring to the people living in 
the REDD+ target locality as a unit, such as "communities", in reports and otherwise, provides a 
harmonious impression that all people living in the area are included in this group, and hold the 
same perceptions, whether it be faith in the project revenues from REDD+, eagerness and 
availability to participation, needs satisfaction, and so on. TFCG / MJUMITA plan a positive 
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approach in relation to this issue, but there is also a negative catch to it. The positive is that they are 
planning a method by which payments from REDD+ goes to individuals. The negative is that, as a 
NGO, they have limited funds and time to work in the villages to make sure that the organizational 
system actually works. 
Conceptualizing the Target Populations for REDD+ 
Revenues and Project Management in Tanzania 
 
Who should be included in forest management and receive revenues from REDD+? I propose that 
the easy answer is: All people that are affected by the project. In this part I would like to suggest 
how to reflect on conceptualizations of the target populations for REDD+. To do this, it is necessary 
to go back in history, to the villagization process which took place in 1973-1976. It is explained by 
Albert K. Barume (2011) as the process of translocating people in Ujamaa villages
24
 on cross of 
cultural backgrounds, lineages and clans, where they were expected to farm on communal farms 
which they had no cultural bonds to. Through this strategy, President Julius Nyerere had the 
intention to create economic independence for Tanzania after the colonial rule, but in the end he 
admitted that he had been wrong. Still the villages are there, and even though the ties to people and 
land within the village might in some way grow stronger, I believe that there were signs of limited 
trust and lack of common visions among people in the village that might have been related to the 
time when “artificial groupings” (Barume, 2011, p. 146) of Ujamaa villages were made. 
It is also necessary to have a look at the internationally and nationally accepted ways to address 
people living in rural areas. In Tanzania the categorization of indigenous people is not very 
commonly used. Larson and Aminzade (2007) explain how the expression has been utilized 
differently in Tanzania as compared to the common international understanding of the term. There 
is no real definition of the expression that is internationally applicable, other than the right to claim 
indigenous self-definition, but the operating definition by international actors, e.g. UN staff, of 
“minorities who are threatened by the nation-state” determines what the authors call the 
“indigeneity”. (Larson and Aminzade, 2007, p. 823) There are some small ethnic groups, like the 
Maasai and the Barabaig, that this definition applies to, but compared to indigenous groups in other 
REDD+ areas, like the Amazon and in Indonesia, they have not had very much impact on the 
national debate of indigenization, as it is considered an illegitimate threat to national unity. This 
                                                 
24
 Ujamaa Vijijini means ”socialism within villages”, and the process of implementing this policy is called 
villagization. (Barume, 2011, p. 140) 
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debate has mainly been concentrated on “the grievances and aspirations of the vast majority of the 
population, black Africans who have been economically marginalized and who see the 
economically dominant Asian minority or neocolonial foreign capital as the source of their 
continuing economic marginalization.” (Larson and Aminzade, 2007, p. 822) Foreign investment 
and economic liberalization has imposed on the significance of indigenization in Tanzania. As 
Larson and Aminzade is also mentioning, I propose that another reason why the international 
understanding does not resonate as well among the Tanzanian population and their memory of the 
colonial history and racial domination strongly, is simply the fact that it is mainly developed in 
relation to the history of people living on other continents of the world. This memory combined 
with how the Tanzanian state has been mainly emphasizing national unity and strengthened the 
division between Tanzanian citizens and foreign investors has prevented people living in rural areas 
to come together and stand up for their specific rights. It has been difficult to come up with 
empowerment projects because it is intangible (Green, 2010). Projects of the like have been seen as 
unpredictable in terms of how the Government that claims to be on the people’s side, not part of 
another racial or ethnical opposition group, could be pushed from a less powerful angle. Therefore, 
the introduction of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) could either, if it succeeds, make some 
significant changes in villagers’ way of thinking about their own rights, or if not, one should keep in 
mind that the project of REDD+ will in any case move on even though people do not fully 
understand the function of FPIC. 
The term local communities can be substituted for the term indigenous people, but I will argue that 
neither of these terms should be taken for granted when considering villagers in groups or entities. 
The reason why I think it is important to reflect upon the content of these terms is that if we assume 
that they imply that the receivers of REDD+ funds are living harmoniously in groups or 
communities, we might forget about some important risks in relation to cooperation within the 
project, and benefit-sharing and empowerment as a result of the project. In one of my villages in 
particular, I would argue that local community can in some way be a problematic term in relation to 
cooperation and shared interests within the village boundaries. First, there were often people from 
other places living there over periods of time while they were renting land or clearing it for their 
own usage and those people would maybe also be affected by the project. Some came to do other 
kinds of work for a period of time, like selling beer, teaching, carpentry and healing through 
witchcraft, but those people would most likely not have that much to do with the project. Second, 
the category community partly tends to draw towards an understanding that it is one entity 
constituted of people with common interests and a good organizational system of leadership and 
governance. Nicholas K. Menzies (2007) discusses the term community, and writes that they are not 
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homogenous entities, but there is continuous change and diversity within them. A community is 
often defined in these CBFM projects due to the matter of place, such as the villages located nearby 
the forests, as in the case of the TFCG piloting of REDD+. Menzies writes that it is important to 
question and define who the community really is on a better basis than that of location or 
boundaries so that one can avoid the risk of disputes over who bears the costs and benefits of the 
project in the future and not undermine events of the project that should be locally attached, like for 
instance decision-making and the ability to monitor utilization of the resources (Menzies, 2007, p. 
118). Instead of defining the expression “community” he would rather “… identify some 
characteristics that foster the kinds of trust, shared values, and expectations of reciprocity that build 
the capacity to take action in pursuit of a collective interest.” (Menzies, 2007, p. 121) By the time I 
was in Ibingu – the village situated close to the road – I experienced several incidents of fights, both 
physical and verbal. 3 of them were about infidelity, 1 about money, and the other cases I do not 
know the cause of. I have no durable indicators on the status of shared values, but I know that 
regarding forest there are different views, some people thought it should be conserved whereas 
others have tried to clear forest for cultivation. Regarding trust I have already given an indicator 
through the stories of the elders about increased alcoholism, and they also said: “[Before 
villagization] we could leave the doors to our houses open as we went to the farm. Now we have to 
use a locker because of all the thefts. We don’t trust people now.” Reciprocity is nevertheless the 
most crucial element of the social environment. Due to all the insecurities that can follow unsteady 
rainfalls and destroyed crops, it is important to strengthen security through a person’s social 
relations. The husband’s family is among the relations that come first in reciprocal treatment, but 
there can also be similar relations to the wife’s family and the neighbours.  
I find that the most objective terms to be used in this setting are the terms “villagers” or “target 
population” (for REDD+ piloting). The Village Land Act 1999 defines the first term as “any person 
ordinarily resident in a village or who is recognised as such by the village council of the village 
concerned” (URT, 1999, Part 1 (2)) Most of the about 9000 villages in Tanzania were established 
once as part of the Ujamaa and villagization policy (Barume, 2011, p. 146) and due to information I 
got in the villages this was also the case for them. If the term “community” is applied to the people 
who are living in a village, there is a risk of undermining the divergence of interests and 
opportunities within the village, and the organizational challenges that need to be overcome to make 
the project work well. Questions that can be raised in relation to this issue are for instance; if the 
level of immigration and migration due to people coming from other villages to rent plots could be 
of relevance for the project; could there be unnecessary difficulties cooperating due to high alcohol 
consumption; what if the level of jealousy and elite capture were to become more recurrent; what if 
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there were conflicts of resources between the two villages that once used to share them? Those are 
questions that are important to address as the project proponent is “picking” sites for the projects. 
 Considering some Risks related to REDD+ 
 
There are several other risks to consider besides the two risks of access to land and natural 
resources, which was mentioned in the citation that initiated this chapter. One is that of reliability 
between actors both within and outside the “local community”, and the potential for increased 
social differences, competition and jealousy within the society. In the case of “my” villages, there 
might be risks of competition between the two. People from Ibingu still have their farms up in 
Lunenzi from the days that they were one village. If the people of Lunenzi decide to conserve the 
forest in an area where an inhabitant of Ibingu has inherited the farming-plot from parents or 
grandparents, conflicts can arise. An option could have been to make the villages cooperate 
regarding the land use planning, since the people of Ibingu are relying on the soil in Lunenzi. I 
asked TFCG field-officers about this option, and they recognized that it could be a good one. From 
what I experienced during my fieldtrip in February, this option has not been considered.  
As Menzies (2007) writes, local elites can easily exploit their position by dominating local 
institutions that are created as part of these kinds of projects, for instance the Village Natural 
Resource Committee that is created as part of REDD+. The RECOFTC principles are also 
proposing the risk of capture by elites of REDD+ benefits (Anderson, 2011, p. 10) Additionally, 
there might be a quite big risk of lacking revenues and unfulfilled promises and expectancies, 
depending on the degree to which REDD+ might actually work out or not. These two last risks can 
be connected to what the villagers risk in relation to time-consumption from the project-activities, 
that comes in addition to the ordinary daily work, of which the biggest share is considered women’s 
work and is very time-consuming. Thus, for some women there are fewer opportunities to 
participate in meetings. Menzies writes that participation in community-based projects can become 
an inequitable burden for poorer people, where elites are the ones that benefit in the end (Menzies, 
2007, p. 121). From my observations in the villages I perceive this as a high risk, as I already met 
villagers in February 2011, who complained that the project had not brought anything for them, but 
the members of the VNRC had received money for the work of marking the threes with red paint as 
part of the land use planning. 
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At ”bibi’s” (grandmother) home, a second home for her daughter, daughters in law and their children, and was a base 
during the day at the farm. 
 
I am having a sip of ” babu’s” local beer – which is a valued gesture to offer your beer. 
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 NGO’s Role 
 
Maia Green refers in her article on NGO work to Tanzanian indices on professional status through 
patronage and the power to command, and the material signifiers of global modernity. She writes 
that the power to command is also shared with an expatriate staff, and stakeholders within 
externally funded development projects are also adapted to the international expectations of 
modernity and wealth, where attached are proceedings of workshops in expensive hotels and the 
latest in vehicles and electronic office equipment (Green, 2003, p. 133). 
Even though not everybody is involved directly in what happens in the field to the same degree as 
the field-officers, there are occasions that make the staff aware that there is another reality outside 
the offices and the five-star hotels where the project is envisioned. Learning lessons can be a tool 
for the future projects, and is the main purpose of piloting. If, on the contrary, the aim is to make the 
project work in the best way for the people in the specific sites, the “so-called policy dialogues in 
five-star hotels” in Dar es Salaam might not be as fruitful as it should have been. Issa Shivji’s 
criticism of NGO’s work in Tanzania is based on the way he has experienced it through his own 
participation in Tanzanian NGOs. What he describes can be interpreted as a notion of “anti-politics” 
(Ferguson, 1990). He writes that NGOs in Tanzania are not substituting themselves for the people, 
as they are neither elected by them nor representing them, and that they will never do so as long as 
they are not able to “expose and oppose imperial domination” (Shivji, 2007, p. 57) referring to the 
funding and neoliberal forces. He suggests that NGO’s role should be to put pressure on the state 
and the democracy so that people themselves can be able to participate in policy-making. He utters 
that the strategies they perform are stifling public debates and the development of alternative 
methods by sticking to “stakeholder conferences” and “inputs into consultants’ policy drafts” 
(Shivji, 2007, p. 58). This can be seen as a form of manipulation and replication of patterning 
within documents that has been emphasized by others, also Riles (2000, p. 79); “The objective was 
not so much to achieve transparent meaning as to satisfy the aesthetics of logics and language”, and 
Green (2003, p. 129); “such documents have more in common with marketing texts than with social 
and economic analysis” in the competition for funding, depending on the current policy discourse 
within the area of development and funding. 
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While elaborating ideas on where frictions can be found to different times in the creation of 
discursive elements of REDD+, I have in the previous chapters been looking at different levels of 
understanding, and at historical and present discursive contexts of development and environment in 
Tanzania. The rest of this thesis will have a closer look at the more specific context of the NGO’s 
work on REDD+. There are different conditional factors that are set by the donors and the 
international driving forces behind the project. I will discuss three of them here, which one can say 
that are already part of an international discourse on development interventions. The first part of 
this chapter aims to show how these conditional factors, which would be accepted, appreciated or 
rejected by different stakeholders to be present during REDD+ implementation, might influence on 
another conditional factor, namely that of transparency. They are corruption, risks and safeguards. 
One might argue that there are several other factors that are also influential in terms of 
transparency, but in respect to the conciseness of this thesis I choose to focus on these three that I 
find have the most relevance for my further argument. The three of them are intertwining in the way 
that corruption itself can be put under the category of risks, and safeguards can be a way of 
preventing risks. Accepting the fact that there will be a quite high level of risks has also had an 
effect on the requirements for implementing safeguards and maybe also on how to follow-up on 
corruption. 
Donors insist on transparent procedures within development interventions, and this is first and 
foremost perceived as assured through a range of documentations. Most important are the reports 
written by project proponents, reviews of the reports done by the donor, and evaluations done by 
independent agencies. This requires a heavy reliance in what is presented in these documents. Yet, 
how do we recognize transparency itself? Is it even possible? What if there are differences between 
what is reported and what is really done in the field, between “the Design” and the ”Real”? This 
division is made by Annelise Riles (2000), and can further be seen in relation to elaborations done 
on discourses, in the way that we here talk about two different discourses, even though they are 
imposing on each other. I would like to approach these questions by mainly making a comparison 
between the theoretical work of Riles and what my own data gathered. I will also see it in relation to 
Michel Foucaults’ work on discourses (Foucault, 1981). Following this, there will be an analytical 
part about how transparency and sharing of information is working within the project, through 
documents, which I have chosen to focus on here. 
 Foucault about Discourse 
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The work of Michel Foucault (ref. in Dove and Carpenter, 2008, pp. 48-49) on power and 
discourses underlies the whole debate on these same issues, that has taken form within 
environmental anthropology, and I will therefore also go into some of it here. The way he has used 
the term is as something that defines knowledge and ways of acting, and he separated it from “the 
paradigm” and “the model” in the way that the statements of the discourse, that also are controlled 
by the discourse, sounds neutral and apolitical, but they are laden with power exercised over the 
dominant as well as the dominated. In his statement from 1970, L’ordre du Discours (Foucault, 
1981), he has elaborated on different procedures that are controlling the discourse. First, he talked 
about the systems of exclusion, which are the “forbidden speech” (not everything is allowed to be 
outspoken), the “division of madness” (the madman’s discourse cannot have the same currency as 
others) and the “will to truth” (the way in which knowledge is valorised, distributed and attributed 
in a society). The last system tries to assimilate the two others. Second group of procedures are the 
internal ones, those that come from the discourse, and reaffirms it. Those are the “commentary” (the 
discourses that are said, remain said, and are to be said again), the “author” (as a principle of 
grouping of discourses), and the “disciplines” (anonymous systems at the disposal to anyone who 
wants to or is able to use them, and who therefore is “in the true”). There’s also a third group of 
procedures, according to Foucault, which is controlling the discourses. That is the “rarefaction of 
the speaking subject”, which means that not everybody got access to partaking in all discourses, 
depending on the level of restrictions to partake in it.  
I suggest that every time that the project of REDD+ receives its consent to be implemented at any 
level – for instance by the Tanzanian Government, the District Government or by the villagers – the 
discourse of REDD+ are accepted as a dominating discourse. That is not to say that actors at these 
levels cannot contribute to the discourse, but as Foucault writes, there is a “forbidden speech”, 
which means that already established discourses will be overrun by this one. Furthermore, some 
individuals’ utterances will not be considered, and not everybody will have access to partaking – 
often as a result of lacking knowledge about it. If one accepts the project, one accepts the discourse. 
If there would be people in the villages that are not accepting the project, and they choose to openly 
disagree, they will become “authors” of a conflicting discourse, and they would create frictions, 
which means there would be bargaining between the discourses, and the project would maybe be 
declined or be adjusted. If these people are rather disagreeing in silence, they would use 
euphemization as a weapon (Scott, 1985), which at the same time means that they would avoid 
frictions, as representatives of the “forbidden speech”, or they would not be able to access the 
discourse. 
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In the following I will talk about elements of a REDD+ discourse; three conditional factors to be 
considered under the implementation of REDD+. These are “commentaries”, the tools that are 
reproducing the discourse, but they are also transferred from another discourse on development 
project assistance, where the “authors”, I propose, have originally been the funders. 
 Elements of a REDD+ Discourse 
Transparency 
Transparency is an exalted pursuit within REDD+ and other development projects, and this is 
mainly because of funds going to countries with high scale of corruption and limited or 
underdeveloped systems of governance. It is often perceived as a contradiction to corruption, where 
the effort to increase the prevalence of one of them would lead to a decrease in the prevalence of the 
other. I suggest that there are more than two sides to this, which I will get back to later in this 
chapter.  
It has become an important emphasis for several NGOs to promote transparency in their work 
towards different stakeholders as a way of assessing their credibility. This is closely linked to 
accountability as another quality-mark. There can be different perceptions as to whether they are 
two different sets of values to strive for, or whether transparency is a prerequisite for accountability. 
An example on the latter is Jo Marie Griesgraber’s description of how the High-Level Panel on IMF 
Board Accountability included transparency as one of four essential characteristics in the evolving 
standards of accountability, whereas the other three were evaluation, participation and external 
complaint mechanism (Griesgraber, 2008, p. 164). In 2006 a group of international NGOs founded 
the ”International Non-Governmental Organisations Accountability Charter” in response to pressure 
from the media, business and governments. The charter is intended to demonstrate NGO’s 
commitment to accountability and transparency, which shows how the two are juxtaposed in this 
setting (INGO Accountability Charter, 2012). Furthermore, NGOs have also put pressure the other 
way, by requesting for transparency-mechanisms and good governance as underlying principles in 
the dialogue with multilateral bodies, like G8 (Martin, 2008). 
It might be convenient to see transparency as part of accountability, considering that an assessment 
of an organization without transparency, whatever this black-box
25
 might entail, would most likely 
not be considered accountable. Which begs the question; what can the term transparency mean in 
                                                 
25
 See chapter 1 about Latour’s statements about ”black-boxes” as social aggregates. 
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the context of organizational work? Elizabeth Ridell-Dixon describes “transparent” as a term that 
implies clearly visible operations that are easily seen through, and when procedures are open to 
public scrutiny. She specifically mentions corruption and abuses of power as a threat that need to be 
uncovered through transparency, and methods that can be used for promoting the latter are open 
meetings and making information freely available (Riddell-Dixon, 2008, p. 94). During my 
fieldwork and the internship at the Embassy I did not experience that it was common to operate 
with open meetings among the NGOs, but they did however arrange workshops for specially invited 
people.  
In the UN-REDD Global Programme Framework 2011-2015 (FAO et al., 2011a) transparency is 
primarily emphasized as crucial aspect of funding, but also some in relation to forest monitoring. 
The framework demands transparency to be promoted by working towards a trusted national 
fiduciary system for performance-based payments, preventing risks of corruption, and 
implementing good governance, policies and measures. When funding is transferred within the 
project it should be transparently done every step of the way via documentation.  
Transparency has to contain more substance than the formality of including it in documents as a 
diffuse goal with no guidelines. It can be rewarding to make an account of how feasible it is in 
practice. What I suggest, is that at the same time as international frameworks incorporate 
transparency as a goal, and the pursuit of transparency is to be found within decision-making 
processes in NGO work, it is often not considered the fact that other ideals to strive towards, that 
are included in the same frameworks and strategies – or legislation for that matter – can actually 
work against the rise of transparency.  
Risks and Corruption 
In April 2011 Norway’s former Minister of the Environment and International Development, Erik 
Solheim, said it was necessary to take the risks of acting fast on REDD+, because to wait for Kongo 
to be like Switzerland would mean that all the forest would be gone by that time (Tømte, 2011). Did 
he forget to consider the risks of the people living in the affected areas of REDD+? There has been 
a common understanding that there will be risks under REDD+. These kinds of risks in 
international development projects can be counteracted by for instance laws on corruption and 
safeguards. In this part I suggest that the actual emphasis on these risks is relative according to the 
kinds of risks we are talking about, and that it strongly depends on who is talking – what in 
Foucault’s terms would be the “authors” of the discourse. 
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The risks of “landgrabbing”, forced migration and other violations of indigenous people’s rights are 
REDD+-related topics that have been frequently illuminated in the media.
26
  What has been most 
emphasized as potential risks in the draft National Strategy for REDD+ in Tanzania is whether 
payments to villages will be sufficient and competitive, but also how this money and other external 
impact under REDD+ can be damaging for the affected people and deprive them from their rights 
(URT, 2010a). The Global Programme Framework has considered risks more broadly, with a high 
emphasis on corruption, but also on other types of risks like the feasibility and sustainability of the 
project in economic and ecologically vulnerable areas, lack of trust in society and political system, 
and indigenous peoples’ and local communities’ unwillingness to participate (FAO et al., 2011a). 
This shows that rights related to people living in the affected areas are respected within the 
international discourse.  
Relatively regardless of what these quite recently prepared documents say about risks, and what the 
discussion is about at international and national level, the contracts of funding are between the 
Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the NGOs, and hence the administration of the 
allocations to the pilot projects is done by The Royal Norwegian Embassy, as the “actors” on behalf 
of The Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. What follows is that the manuals for administration 
of funds are those that are developed by Norad, which is the directorate of development assistance 
under the Ministry. Therefore, there are some risks that are particularly emphasized which follow 
the common regulations for disbursement of money, and which are reflected in the contracts.
27
  
Regardless of whether REDD+ contains principles of safeguards and payment for performance to 
be implemented, the Norwegian restrictions for receiving funds for piloting REDD+ did not 
demand safeguards to be implemented. This is not to say that the organizations did not recognize 
the need for safeguards, but it did remain a diffuse and suppressed theme for discussion at the 
national level for the first two years after a contract with the Tanzanian Government was signed. 
Thus, the situation is reflective of previously introduced adage of trying to “fly a plane while 
building it”. At the same time, one can see how the existing discourse of development assistance is 
put directly onto the REDD+ discourse in the way of the Norwegian bureaucratic administration-
system - the place where one is least likely to find events of frictions. This can be a reason to why 
the safeguards were forgotten in the initial process, as a need for debates on guidelines for the 
project at this level was not realized. 
                                                 
26
 REDD Monitor is the most important channel for informal discussions on REDD+ initiatives: http://www.redd-
monitor.org/ 
27
 The Royal Norwegian Embassy gives access to the contracts on this webpage: 
http://www.norway.go.tz/News_and_events/agreements_and_contracts/ 
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Norway operates with a principle of “zero-tolerance” for corruption related to financial support. The 
meaning that the Norwegian Government ascribes to this principle of “zero-tolerance” is that future 
disbursements will be halted, and there will be demands of repayment and compensation in cases 
where there is reasonable suspicion of corruption (Glenne et al., 2010). The tricky thing with it is 
that good guidelines are not fully developed. Inflexibility in practice, when it comes to reporting on 
corruption, can be a problem at several levels. Research has found that a strict corruption-policy 
like the one that is used by the Norwegian Department of Foreign Affairs (UD), leads to less 
dialogue between the parties, less reporting, and can work against the overall goal of the funded 
initiative (Trivunovic et al., 2011). In relation to the funding for REDD+ preparations in Tanzania, 
corruption has already been detected and funding for the project has been halted (Makoye, 2012).  
A widely acknowledged definition of corruption is “abuse of public trust for private gain” (Uwazi, 
2008, p. 1). To explain how little the “public trust” is perceived as something worth investing in for 
most civilians, I refer to the section in chapter 3 about conceptualizing the “communities” for 
REDD+ revenues to get an idea of how fragile the public trust can be. Results from the survey 
Fordia Corruption Perception Index for Tanzania from 2008 showed that on a household-level there 
is a wide understanding that the source of corruption is greed and selfishness, and the problem of 
this is acknowledged as a socially bad phenomenon, first because it denies people their rights to 
social services, second because it erodes public trust in the judicial system. The survey also shows 
that 43% of ordinary Tanzanians confess to having, at least once, paid a bribe as means to access 
services in the Local Government Authorities (LGA). 95.4 % of those who do so, do it forcefully in 
their own perception (Uwazi, 2008). What the survey shows is that there is a market for corruption 
when people are pressured. 
Corruption is widespread in Tanzania, at every level, as the poverty level creates a high demand for 
bribery. One example within the tax administration, when the 1996 reform which introduced 
Tanzania Revenue Authority (TRA) seemed for a period to be improving the situation of corruption 
within the section, until it increased again. A CMI report suggests that it is partly because compared 
to bribes, the pay rates offered of tax officers are not likely to be high enough (Fjeldstad, 2002). A 
reason why corruption is so embedded in Tanzanian society can be related to emergency at lower 
level – the level of poverty in relation to highly challenging market-forces. The food-prizes in 
Tanzania had been estimated to having increased more than 30 % since the beginning of year 2011 
up to February 2012 (Mbashiru, 2012). At that point the Annual Inflation Rate for food consumed 
at home and away from home was 25.5%, which has decreased to 24.7 % in April 2012, but is still 
high (National Bureau of Statistics, 2012). Low wages compared to these prizes may have been of 
the contributing causes to what I have experienced as a somewhat openness in relation to 
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transactions that can be termed corruption. It does not mean that everyone is fine with it; it is a 
known problem, especially in the work of building trust among people. In one REDD+ village that I 
briefly visited in Zanzibar, there were questions about how to solve problems with the people 
patrolling the forest, which often received bribes from people who had abused laws that had been 
agreed upon regarding the utilization of resources in the forest area. Members of the village that we 
talked to perceived it as a problem for the society, but at the same time there were understandings as 
to why this happened, as one explanation that they gave was that many people were related and it 
would be difficult to deny relatives access to what they needed in the forest. Another example is the 
NGO that officially follows a policy of not paying people in the villages for participating in 
meetings because of restrictions towards funders. In practice I experienced that the field-team had 
decided to pay them, both out of moral reasons, considering little spare-time left from the farm and 
the domestic work, and because of own interests of gathering as many people as possible. Looking 
at it this way one can maybe start a discussion on what is more moral between zero-tolerance of 
corruption as what we associate with the word corruption itself, and corruption as bending the strict 
policy of a NGO, which is again created to satisfy donors, to support the people in poor areas with 
an option to participate in the meetings, or accepting briberies to satisfy their basic needs. My effort 
by giving these examples of corruption is to create an understanding of how much corruption has 
become infiltrated at different levels  in Tanzania and why it is problematic to expect zero-tolerance 
in relation to corruption.  
My purpose with this section is also to shed light on the fact that even though there has been a 
common understanding that there are risks related to REDD+, the risks related to the people living 
in the villages that have been included in the project are clearly coming in the second line, whereas 
the risks related to the funders – the part that concerns what will happen to Norwegian tax-payers’ 
money – is much more pre-oriented in the means that the pre-condition of no corruption is already 
specifically included in the contract. Not only are those risks related to the donor country more 
frequently considered in contractual terms, but risks related to those living in the REDD+ villages 
are also less outspoken and communicated to them, something I will return to in the next chapter. 
If the risks for the environment including its inhabitants in the relevant areas are to get more 
significance than merely attention in international discussions, should they not be considered at the 
same political level as the risks of corruption? To me this shows the agency of controlling 
transparency, when certain risks are taken seriously and others not. It is nevertheless evident that 
some of the agency here rests with the contract document, which is something that can confirm 
Latour’s arguments about the agency of objects (Latour, 2005, pp. 63-86). 
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Safeguards 
 
REDD has the potential to save forests and benefit the local communities around them, but it also 
could do enormous harm in terms of forcing people off their traditional lands, destroying natural 
ecosystems for the sake of maximising carbon, and creating new wealth which is hogged by the few. 
That’s why we have these things called “safeguards”.  What we could have got out of Durban was 
some minimum standards for reporting, a format, a review mechanism, and perhaps even a grievance 
procedure. What we got instead was a tame declaration that all safeguards should be reported on, as 
transparently as possible, according to a timetable that will be discussed next year. And there will be 
another meeting next year to discuss whether any more guidance than that is needed.
28
 
 
Prior to the COP17 conference in Durban different stakeholders were gathered in a workshop in Dar 
es Salaam to discuss which topics Tanzania should showcase in the conference. Safeguards were 
among the topics, but since there was no national strategy for them at the moment, the decision that 
the NGOs themselves should present their own safeguards was made. What was evident from the 
workshop, was that the ones that had the most comprehensive guidelines for safeguarding activities 
was a private plantation company, which was not doing any REDD+ initiatives at that time.  
The matter of safeguards is a wide theme. The term has been frequently used within the REDD+ 
discourse, especially during the last year. In this setting it can roughly be divided into social- and 
environmental safeguards. The intention in relation to the REDD+ initiatives has been that they 
should follow a political strategy at national level, and therefore the issue of safeguards has also 
been considered as national responsibility. There are different international standards that can be 
followed, but the NGOs themselves have not been obliged to follow these, as they have signed 
contracts with Norway directly, and these contracts did not include safeguards, but a separate 
paragraph 8 on corruption and annual audits of financial statements are included.  This is also due to 
the fact that safeguards for UN-REDD first became a main request in the Cancun Agreements that 
came out from the COP 16 conference in December 2010 (UNFCCC, 2011, Annex 1, §2), and 
hence there is a big black hole related to accountability on the issue. An options assessment report 
prepared by the Meridian Institute for The Norwegian Government in 2009 did mention safeguards 
in relation to the strategy of Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). This was however not 
mentioned as something that should be part of the REDD agreements, but more like an 
“international norm” that “…can play a role in enhancing procedural rights…” (Angelsen et al., 
2009, pp. 27-28). Norway did recognize the need for safeguards on biodiversity and procedures of 
                                                 
28
 Excerpt from the blog titled ”Progress on REDD at CoP17” written by CARE’s Technical Advisor Raja Jarrah in 
TZ-REDD Newsletter issue no. 6, January 2012. Accessible from: http://www.tnrf.org/reddnewsletter6#highlights4 
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free, prior and informed consultations for those affected by REDD+ under a submission to the 
AWG LCA
29
 (2009). Nevertheless, a real-time evaluation done on Norway’s International Climate 
and Forest Initiative (NICFI)
30
 came with a report in 2011, which was negative on the point where it 
found the initiative too vague on Norway’s expectations and demands towards the pilot countries on 
biological and human protection within REDD+ (Tipper et al., 2011, p. 57). 
In Tanzania it has been very hard to develop discussions and understanding surrounding safeguards 
at national level, and that can be due to the fact that it has also been a blurry debate at international 
level, and hence little guidance on how to move forward on this vague phenomenon of safeguards. 
The quotation in the beginning of this section expresses that there is a lot of frustration regarding 
the blurriness on what should be NGOs’ obligations to safeguards. In the UN REDD Global 
Programme Framework 2011-2015 it is said that: 
 
Thanks to its experience and activities on … iii)FPIC; iv) social and environmental risk 
identification and mitigation approaches … the UN-REDD Programme is well placed to provide 
guidance and support to establish such systems.
31
   
(FAO et al., 2011a, p. 35) 
 
What the UN organizations presented in September 2011 on Social and Environmental Principles 
and Criteria under UN-REDD, was that this risk identification and mitigation tool, as is mentioned 
in the citation above, were to be piloted trough out 2012, whilst the principles and criteria 
themselves, which are supposed to support countries in building a national approach to the 
safeguards agreed upon in Cancun, were to be approved in 2012 (FAO et al., 2011b). It shows the 
relatively slow motion at UN level. My effort here is to make clear that for those that see safeguards 
as included within REDD+ due to how the international REDD+ discourse has embraced them, it 
should be pointed out that they are not included in the Tanzanian initiatives that are running today. 
Therefore, one can question whether safeguards really are mechanisms without any substance for 
legitimizing REDD+, and hence working against the pursuit of transparency. I hope this figure can 
illustrate my point: 
                                                 
29
 The AWG LCA is a working group to facilitate discussions on how to implement the UNFCCC. 
30
 NICFI is equivalent to the Norwegian initiatives on REDD+. 
31
 The systems in question refers to Article 71(d) of the Cancun Agreements which calls for REDD+ countries to 
develop systems for providing information on how the safeguards that are described in the annex 1 of the agreements 
are being addressed and respected. 
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 Promoted as 
part of 
agreement/ 
present in 
contract 
documents 
Exists with  high 
probability 
during 
implementation 
Promoted 
through 
Tanzania’s 
national 
draft 
strategy  
Promoted in 
REDD+ 
mechanisms 
and 
international 
framework 
Transparency 
promoted 
through 
inclusion or 
exclusion of 
principles 
Risks Positive Positive Positive Positive Negative 
Korruption Negative Positive Negative Negative Negative 
Safeguards Negative Negative Positive Positive Negative 
 
Fig. 1: Three conditional factors for REDD+ consideration and how they promote transparency. 
 
Explaining the model: I argue that the common understanding that there will be several risks in 
REDD+ can both minimize the seriousness that it deserves, and also that it can put attention 
towards certain obvious risks and then forget about those that were less foreseen at an early stage. 
The risk of corruption gets special treatment. If risks of corruption appear in a report, this issue is so 
sensitive that the consequences compared to those if one reported lack of social or environmental 
safeguards, which are not captured in any legal document, would be perceived as much more 
serious, and it should be thoroughly reasoned why the word corruption has been mentioned in the 
report, and why the project is then still receiving funds. In the end the result is therefore that the 
pressure to implement specific safeguards like FPIC can easily become lower from the donor side 
compared to the pressure to prove the absence of, or I would rather say not mention the risk of, 
corruption. Safeguards have been more talk than action up till now, and is therefore used as an 
element of the discourse that is legitimizing itself by what Foucault calls the “authors” of the 
discourse at the international level. Transparency is therefore not promoted through safeguards at 
the present stage. 
The Aesthetics of Information-Sharing and Decision-
Making as Commentaries to the REDD+ Discourse 
 
As I have already described earlier in this chapter, “commentaries” are what Foucault sees as what 
is said and done to reaffirm the discourse. “Authors” are needed to make those “commentaries”. 
This part aims to see how aesthetics is tied to the process of making those “commentaries”, and I 
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suggest that they are supplying to information, form and facts within the REDD+ discourse, while 
also drawing on existing discourses. First and foremost, I want to describe how this works towards 
sharing of information through the well-known designs of documents that are what Latour calls 
“artifacts” distributed within the “network” of similar institutions as the NGO. The document in 
question is the TFCG Project Proposal. The document was initially the most concise and concrete 
presentation of information on the TFCG / MJUMITA pilot project. It contained the “logframe” 
with the different activities that the project would be doing in relation to their schedule. 
Nevertheless, it did not contain FPIC, neither did it say anything about an agricultural expert. It did 
say something about considering so-called “cross cutting issues”, that are requested by the donor 
countries to be included, like “… ensuring that AIDS-related messages are inserted into exiting 
training and capacity building processes at the community level”. (TFCG, 2009, p. 37) These 
“cross-cutting issues”, the other two being promoting gender-equality and addressing poverty, are 
issues that already were decided to be included from before, as part of the existing discourse on 
development and conservation in Tanzania, and illustrate how they can be transferred from one 
Project Proposal to the other, regardless of the project. Riles calls it “patterning”. 
Some of the reason for why I became interested in the way information about the REDD+ project 
was distributed at different levels, was because there seemed to be so many speculations 
surrounding what the project was really about – was it really something new to Tanzania, or was it 
just funding for continuing what the NGOs already did? Would it really mean revenues for people 
living nearby the forest, and in any case – would the amount be considerable? Was Tanzania really 
the right country for piloting REDD+? With all these uncertainties among the NGO-staff as well as 
at national and international level, I of course wondered like everybody else how they would be 
able to explain this to the people living in the villages. In other words, the big question was if 
“authors” for the REDD+ discourse were really available, and what would be the consequences if 
not. As I have described earlier, the discourse merged into what was already present in the world of 
funding for development and conservation in Tanzania, and by drawing on this old discourse, and 
making less frictions, the problem seemed to be solved. It seemed at least to be the case within the 
designs of the project. 
I will continue to find basis for my arguments in Riles (2000) work on the aesthetics of information. 
I have been talking about a discourse on REDD+, which has grown much more rich since the initial 
stages. It has been interesting and engaging to follow this process, the initiatives around the world 
have been triggering creative thoughts and engaging debates, and several times we are reminded of 
how big this is – that we are actually part of the first meetings of these kinds. These kinds of 
aesthetic emphasis got much attention during conferences and workshops on REDD+. The 
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engagement that is felt when we are reminded about the scope of the information-sharing and 
decision-making in the project of which we are partaking or even only observing from the sideline, 
is a similar case to what I think Riles is writing about when referring to the aesthetics of information 
within the “NGO-network”.  She has mixed definitions made by Bateson and Strathern on 
information and aesthetics to come up with a perception based on the persuasiveness of form and 
elicitation of appropriateness with the need for a pattern to connect through information sharing. 
Riles also writes about design as a “networked craft of visual manipulations of the aesthetics of 
communication,” (Riles, 2000, p. 20) and say that their purpose is not to describe fully but to 
channel attention. What is crucial about the design is that it should be possible to remake it or 
pieces of it in different settings. Let me illustrate what such a visual manipulation might look like: 
 
  
Fig. 2: The organizational structure of TFCG as presented in their Project Proposal 
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Fig. 3: MJUMITA organizational structure, as presented in their Project Proposal 
 
These are the organizational structures of the two organizations. The arrows are representing the 
information-flow. What I want to illuminate, is that they both have the technical advisors illustrated 
as imposing on the staff from the sideline, where no information is going back to them. It might be 
true that they had limited knowledge about the project areas, since they were mainly working in the 
office, but that is also why there had to be a lot of information going back to them. The way I 
experienced these positions and their significance and relevance during the time I was there was 
that those positions of the technical advisors were the most central ones to the accumulation of and 
influence on discursive knowledge, and the TFCG Technical Advisor was what Riles terms the 
“Focal Point” in the organization, in relation to exchange of information within the project and 
maybe, in Riles’ conceptualizations, with an “aesthetic attraction, the desire to captivate that it 
evidences.” (Riles, 2000, p. 130) In addition to being the one to follow up on international processes 
on REDD+, she is also the one that receives information from the field-officers. The TFCG 
Technical Advisor was in some way the control-organ of the project, and in the figure it would have 
been more right to put her in the middle of the model with several arrows going both ways in 
different directions. The technical advisors were not only advisors as such. They were in addition to 
the executive directors the only ones who knew, if any, what REDD+ was really about. The TFCG 
Technical Advisor and Executive Director were also the ones that knew what was the organization’s 
expectations and role within REDD+ in Tanzania, whereas MJUMITA is more of a supporter to 
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their founder organization and their decisions about REDD+. When asking the field-officers about 
this issue, I was told to go asking the senior staff – the people occupying these two already 
mentioned positions. The reason for this might be that all the other people working on the project 
were temporarily employed, while Technical Advisor and Executive Director were not. 
Riles writes that information has the ability to create a “gap” in the way it is relative in its paucity of 
meaning and content. This further gives ground to her references to Strathern’s arguments on how 
information can be seen differently from different points of views, as she argues all phenomena are 
infinitely complex. This depends on “… an aesthetic that places a central emphasis on the quality of 
information …” (Riles, 2000, p. 18) For instance, the Project Proposal contains several 
conceptualized terms from both the international discourse on REDD+ and the national discourse 
on forest conservation and NGO work, and the language is quite technical in relation to this. Some 
of the “new” terms that came with REDD+ have been heavily emphasized, and those that are 
related to what is “new” with REDD+, like the mechanisms that will measure the basis for REDD+ 
revenues, and how these revenues should be handled, have been even more exalted than those of the 
mechanisms for securing people’s rights. 
Having a look into different project proposals one soon realizes the system of writing them, where 
the most crucial component is the so-called logical framework, showing output-activities related to 
the timeline and preferably costs inside a matrix. The practical purpose of the design is that it is 
cross-culturally recognizable and transferable in its meaning and utilization, that it should be 
possible to cut out parts and paste it into a similar design, like what I have done above, so that 
processes can move quicker, for instance in bureaucratic processes on cross of boarders.  
Having these procedures saves time, as project proponents know the discourse and codes designing 
a project, and it can cause less friction if the project proponents know how to write them well. It 
would lead to less discussion with the donors on what should be included, and how much money 
should be used on a certain activity etc. If there nevertheless would be lack of for instance attention 
paid to gender equality or HIV/aids issues within the documents, the donor can easily refer to the 
regulations of the donor-country, and how this should be addressed within the designed project. 
There should also not be too much friction, as donors and proponents should be two collaborating 
parties where trust is perceived as important for good collaboration, and frictions in the Tanzanian 
donor/recipient relationship can be seen as something negative and something that foster distrust.  
Riles writes that on Suva (Fiji), the design often seemed to replace the project itself, so that whereas 
the design of the project is “the project”, what is happening in the villages is something else. What 
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can it be? She is making a distinction between the Design and the Real, and the Real is perceived as 
something that is outside the “network” of institutions and knowledge practices and the artifacts of 
these that are continually reflecting upon themselves as a “network”, and hence constituting its 
existence, which is superseding reality. The “networks” are also conduits for the flow of 
information and enlightenment (Riles, 2000, p. 173). What she aims at is the creation of a discourse 
within the “network”, which is based on this kind of information, and that this again is the base for 
the creation of designs, which “make no appeal to a reality outside and beyond themselves” (Riles, 
2000, p. 143), although there is an awareness of a different “world out there”. At the same time as 
the Real among the people participating in the “networks” that she describes was seen as outside the 
design and the “network”, there was also a powerful appeal towards it, and an awareness of the 
lack, which would occasionally stimulate the urge for “Action” and effort to approach the Real. 
Those attempts to enact the Real through discussions about language and meaning, activism and 
negotiations of funding would frequently declare the lacks regarding the Real within the function of 
the “network”, which as mentioned would only exist through reflections upon itself.  
In relation to my analysis, what is crucial is how she sees information as relative depending on the 
aesthetical condition – here I am focused on the aesthetics of bureaucratic system – and how the 
aesthetics of relevant information highly impacts on forms of design, which are artifacts within the 
“network”. As Riles writes; “… aesthetic of system has implications for the character of the 
information it systematizes – for what we might call the aesthetics of fact (Riles, 2000, p. 138).  
In the next part I have described how this explains the NGO’s emphasis on upward accountability 
compared to the downward accountability – why the NGO’s are so susceptible to the bureaucratic 
system, which runs more easily without frictions. It is of course because of the necessity to adapt to 
the donor demands, but it does also have a strong aesthetical side to it, which is attached to the 
aesthetics of how information is presented in form and facts within what Riles terms the “network”, 
but what I term “stakeholders” in the context of this thesis. 
 NGO – Nothing Going On? 
 
It had already started to get dark when I arrived at the TFCG / MJUMITA office that Saturday. The 
TFCG Technical Advisor and a representative from a cooperating NGO were working there. I was 
hoping to get some information about where we were going the next day. “We” were the same 
representative, whom I from now on will call Anna, Makaa, and me. Makaa was the manager of the 
project. I was surprised to see them working there in the dark on a Saturday, although I had 
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understood that it was not uncommon for the Technical Advisor to have long working hours. They 
seemed slightly stressed, and I found it rather convenient to leave the place after some advices to 
bring snacks and sensible shoes, and the message from Technical Advisor that we would go 
“wherever we decide tonight”. I was surprised by the small and seemingly arbitrary, or spontaneous 
forum where this decision was made. 
“So which villages are we going to?” I asked Makaa the next day. I had put on my converse-
branded shoes, which was the closest I got to sensible, and was ready for my very first trip to 
“somewhere-rural-areas” outside Dar es Salaam. Makaa was morning-tired and restless to leave 
after waiting nearly half an hour in the car for Anna, who were discussing with the receptionist at 
the hotel about the price of her room, as he answered; “actually, Heidi, we are not going to the 
villages this time, we will only be going to the districts to talk to different people, forest officers and 
natural resource officers and maybe some other staff” I was disappointed as I heard that all the 
information for making the site-selection, like the drivers of deforestation and poverty level, was to 
be gathered at district level, and that no consultation was to be done among the villagers 
themselves. If the districts were chosen before the villages, it meant that at least a certain number of 
villages in the area were bound to be included, without the villagers being aware of it, and without 
the organizations knowing the people and the area. The TFCG Technical Advisor and Anna had 
made a selection of four districts that we went to, whereof two were chosen during a workshop later 
in Dar es Salaam, where the information gathered was presented. 
From the very start of the trip the conversation between the two officers was set with the theme 
“REDD”. They were very eager in discussing, most of the time it was about “what are we really 
doing?” Makaa seemed to try to hunt out a way to legitimize it all, while Anna was the one giving 
him “answers” – though not very optimistically; “REDD is really nothing new besides the money, it 
is business. We have the carbon market already, and we have the techniques through PFM. If 
REDD doesn’t bring us anything else, why should we bother to test it out?” The conversation came 
to an arousal at the moment Anna gave Makaa a number of dollars that she assumed to be the sum 
of what the local people would receive from the REDD project – 10 US dollars each a year. Further, 
that would be 0.03 dollars a day. Makaa obviously went into a mild form of desperation when he 
heard this, and he seemed very unsatisfied with the position he just found himself in. Out of 
frustration he said he wanted to call his bosses, to make them explain to him what sort of mission 
they were actually sending him on. “Do they want me to tell the villagers that we will give them 10 
dollars a year to stop farming?” This was something he said to express his frustrations at the 
moment, and he never called them. “What would you do in my position, Heidi? Would you have the 
balls to tell them that?” he asked me. I had to compose myself in finding a good answer, having 
62 
 
been nausea from the bumpy road we were driving in for the last two hours, and trying to make 
some unreadable notes at the same time. I did not really manage it, and answered: “no”. The two of 
them seemed to have quite big doubts regarding their jobs, and whether this kind of work was even 
worth their allowance. Anna was focused on this, and justified it through the fact that somebody 
were going to do this anyway, they could just as well govern the process, and anyway, they had to 
pay their bills.  
I heard one reason to why Makaa was not working for the organization some weeks later. Maybe 
the event I described above could be another one. At least he told m that if he did not have other 
opportunities, he would still be working for the organization. I had several conversations with him 
later, and he said he was happy to contribute to my knowledge about NGO work and forest 
conservation in Tanzania. He said I did him a favor to explain his version of it: How the site-
selection had been a rubber-stamping process where the organization had already decided their two 
districts before the workshop took place; how the organization had just left all activities in one area 
during an earlier project as it did not work out well with the authorities in the area; how there was 
seldom any revenues for the villagers in these projects; now this REDD that he had thought would 
be the solution to all the problems with lacking revenues seemed to be no solution at all. “Forest 
conservation is killing people slowly, cut down the damn forest and put something useful there – 
plantations, or farms – something that the people can make use of! These NGOs, they are just in 
there for the money, they don’t care. N-G-O – Nothing Going On! Put that down! Damn!” he said, 
while he pointed hard towards my notebook. I had obviously put some fire on his mind about things 
he had wanted to utter for a long time. 
The incident of friction described above represents two persons’ view on the project in its early 
stages, and does not necessarily represent all stakeholders’ views on the project and NGO work. I 
find the case important in illuminating agency and accountability among NGO staff, and how 
information has been shared, or not shared, within the NGO. In analytical terms, this friction did not 
lead to anything new other than new information for Makaa, which made him change his opinion 
about the project. He nevertheless continued in his position, and therefore Anna’s information 
seemed like an intermediary at the moment. However, it was a mediator, in the way that it strongly 
affected his opinion, and hence his position as a Project Manager, and can have been affecting him 
to quit his position.  
I was surprised by the impact that Anna’s information had on Makaa. It showed that the occupation 
as a REDD Project Manager did not necessarily imply that one would know too much about the 
project itself. It could also be a sign that he did not really believe in the project, considering his 
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views upon NGO work itself. Should not sufficient information from the senior-staff have been 
given for him to be comfortable in what he was about to do? His occupation entails acting 
professional and to have the responsibility to lead the project coordination team, to communicate 
between project staff, external organizations, Government and media among others, and thus it 
would be important for him to have a lot of information about REDD+.  
However, both Makaa and Anna seemed to disclaim their accountability as actors within the 
REDD+ discourse. Despite the friction, Makaa did still not call his bosses to claim better “work-
conditions” in form of less responsibility in what he had been set to do. What Anna meant with 
“govern the process” I do not know, but there might be little intended actions underlying. What was 
evident was that their intentions with what they were doing were good, but they perceived the 
situation as being out of their hands. Makaa told me: “They have to realize that forest conservation 
is expensive. You have to address the whole issue of poverty, and that is not cheap.” This runs 
contrary to what was the original idea of REDD+, which was seen as a cheap way of improving 
climate change conditions. 
An Attempt to Locate Agency and Accountability 
 
As I received the Project Proposal from the technical advisor in TFCG I was told; “don’t circulate 
it, “cause it’s not an official document”. So the proposal was not supposed to be shown to 
everybody. I found this inconvenient, since the pursuit of transparency seemed to be talked about 
and emphasized to a high degree. I will argue that the Project Proposal has a lot of agency 
depending on how it is used and by whom. It describes the project itself in the most concrete 
manner, but it is not equivalent to the project. Although depending on international decisions, the 
project at local level is being formed by different people’s perceptions to it, and some of these 
opinions are influenced by the content of the Project Proposal depending on how meticulous the 
field-staff has been reading it, and how the content has been presented to others. When I asked one 
of the field-officers about how they had gone through the proposal in the start-up phase of the 
project, he told me that there had been no careful review of it in the plenary to make sure that the 
staff had understood the content of it, but they had received a copy and went through it roughly, so 
they had only ascertained the general idea of REDD+. I argue that the Project Proposal has got the 
agency to produce different thinking about the project. This again imposes on and is part of the net 
of processes that later constitutes the project in action. These are also frictions, as events that in 
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some way can be imposing on the steering of global processes in a sometimes different direction 
than what was intended. Also through the documents is the REDD+ discourse dynamic and 
constantly evolving, as they present agendas that are being imposed on it in different ways at 
different times and in different places. I propose that they are working as “authors” and “mediators” 
at the same time, in the way that they are giving information about the projects, which is changing 
according to the perception of the person who is reading it. I also propose that besides these 
documents, there was a lack of “authors”, which would lead to frustration and lack of information 
among the staff as well as the villagers. 
Accountability in the development context implies the responsibility to outcomes of interventions, 
and is therefore important to be localized within development work in the way that somebody 
should be responsible for the consequences of actions, and not only the way they are implemented 
(Trivunovic, 2011, p. 11). What I have tried to demonstrate at several points throughout this thesis, 
is that the agency and accountability of TFCG / MJUMITA as REDD+ pilot organizations at 
international level is crucial in the present form of the REDD+, and that the NGOs are also the ones 
that probably have the largest urge to push for decisions and obligations in international forum, 
which would be in their favour. At the same time, partly because of the aesthetics of knowledge, 
facts, system, form and results, partly because of the necessity of satisfying donor requirements, the 
upward accountability is often stronger than the downward- and internal accountability (Ebrahim, 
2003). As Kontinen (2004) is emphasizing, one should also be reminded that the NGOs themselves 
are in some way depending on good cooperation with the villagers, so that they can get good results 
from the projects and further funding. This is where it is necessary to advocate an understanding of 
the local needs and situation in international forum, so as to impose on the decisions made for the 
future projects. If, however, the local needs are not expressed, as a result of having too little 
knowledge about the project, or because of villagers “social weapon” of euphemization, localizing 
accountability can be difficult. 
Riles wants to give attention to how seamless knowledge-practices of intergovernmental and UN 
character fade into one’s own, and she describes how the Pacific NGOs that she was working with 
increasingly adapted to these practices to be able to participate in the debate that concerned them. 
She mentions that the NGOs are also gaining legitimacy together with the UN institutions from 
these conferences, and the NGO community claims them to validate their own significance and 
promote their causes nationally and internationally. This shows how strongly dependent the NGOs 
are, of the conferences, of other institutions, and of the documents produced as results of these 
conferences, where “the only way to counter a text is with a better text” (Riles, 2000, p. 13) An 
effort she makes by promoting all these issues is to show the adaptation to an information-system of 
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documents and conferences that moves towards the initial hope of UN to produce international 
practices and norms.  
What can be positive for the organizations is if they are able to be active in the work of promoting 
the making of a national strategy that is in accordance with an international framework when 
possible. This would show the accountability of some organizations in the facilitations for REDD+ 
at national level, at the same time as it also shows their desire to find the “unsolved solutions” 
within the REDD+ programme to get an idea of how to move forward, and to see how the pilots can 
fit into the future frames of REDD+, they have some pressure to follow these international 
standards for the sustainability of these projects. In a review made by TFCG they have compared 
four different internationally recognized safeguard standards (UN-FCCC, FCPF, UN-REDD and 
REDD-SES) towards the national REDD+ strategy to evaluate where gaps and weaknesses are 
within the national REDD+ strategy and other national policy frameworks. TFCG expressed the 
urgency to get this Strategy in place.   
Whether firm ideas about safeguards are stipulated in political decisions or not seems to make all 
the difference in the work of development agencies, because without the decisions the 
accountability and hence the transparency can to a quite high degree escape the project. An example 
is to for instance draw this in relation to what I have pointed out earlier, that there were no 
obligations for the NGOs to do FPIC, and TFCG is the only organization that claim to do this, and 
none of the organizations have got any obligations due to their contracts to include specific 
safeguards – even though the discussions on safeguards for securing the rights of indigenous people 
and protect biodiversity have been going on at international level for a long time. This does not 
mean that what is decided at international level will automatically be applied at lower level, it is 
also a matter to interpret and adapt the decisions to the relevant project and context for 
implementation. At the implementation level, as a result of less obligations towards safeguards 
because they were still unclear, the discussions were put to the side to make way for new things that 
had to be sorted out in relation to REDD+ - namely mechanisms related to the money; like the 
monitoring and verification of the REDD+ forest areas, carbon-markets and benefit-sharing. 
Although social rights to some extent are at stake in the NGO project proposals, there have been no 
obligations to safeguarding them, and it has been more to a voluntary degree from the organizations 
themselves, and not through the contractual obligations that set the standard for reporting. Hence, 
my proposal is that the contracts, that are supposed to make clear the responsibility-standards 
between the parties, should promote more accountability on safeguard-issues and affected people’s 
rights. It is important that there should be a pre-condition for starting implementing REDD+ 
initiatives that equals the risks of the poor in the form of safeguards like FPIC with the risks of the 
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donor in the form of corruption
32
. The latter has already got a lot of attention, and been carefully 
reviewed upon, but the former has basically only been talked about. 
Part of the aim of this chapter has been to see how the lack of adapted accountability among 
international proponents of the REDD+ regime and funders of initiatives are affecting the process 
of implementation, and the inefficiency of talking about safeguards and zero tolerance of corruption 
when guidelines are absent. However, at lower level there are also evidences of too little 
accountability. 
Under the Oslo REDD Exchange conference in June 2011 a representative from the Rainforest 
Foundation Norway requested that the UN organizations and the World Bank should be clearer on 
their obligations to implement the rights of indigenous people into their policies of REDD. Another 
way of saying this could be to say that obligations to safeguards like FPIC should be clearer within 
the Programme. A lot has happened on the development of principles within UN-REDD since that 
time, and a lot has also happened at local implementation level since that time. I suggest that these 
obligations should also have been more prevalent in the Norwegian piloting initiatives. 
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 I am aware that corruption is not only a risk for the donor, but it is also a risk for the function of the societies where 
the money goes. Nevertheless I choose to put the two principles of zero-tolerance for corruption and safeguards up 
against each other in this text to illustrate the difference in prioritizing, as the contracts do not say anything about 
addressing these types of lower level corruption, and it would therefore be little use in talking about these kinds of risks 
in relation to them. 
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 Village Meeting and FPIC 
 
Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) has slowly been formed into a strategy that is opposing 
the saying frequently heard in the 1950’s and 60’s world of development work; “You can’t make an 
omelet without breaking eggs” (Goodland, 2004, p. 66).  
In this chapter I intend touch on how risks are being communicated by TFCG / MJUMITA, and to 
what has been termed the target-communities for REDD+ piloting at the very initial stage of project 
implementation. I will discuss how this is done in relation to the principles of Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC), which is obliged under the guidance of UN-REDD.
33
 Whilst informing 
about REDD+ the project proponents should make sure that a “Balanced treatment of potential 
positive and negative impacts takes place, as identified by both parties, including direct and 
opportunity costs” (Anderson, 2011, p. 21). Despite a heavy emphasis at international level on the 
importance of including these FPIC guidelines together with REDD+, they are still per May 2012 in 
draft version in the UN (UN-REDD, 2011).  
Even though TFCG / MJUMITA are now implementing FPIC as part of the project, the emphasis of 
this did not occur until late in the introductory-phase of the piloting, and there were no signs of 
using them while I did my fieldwork. Therefore I question the way FPIC is done, as it is not 
introduced to the villagers “Prior” to REDD+ implementation. It can be put it in relation to what I 
have earlier written on obligations to safeguards, to see if they really promote transparency, or if 
they rather serve another purpose, namely the aesthetics of information and facts through 
developing “lessons learnt”. I want to show here, that the mechanism can be important for project 
implementation, at the same time as the way it is done is similarly crucial. This not only has to do 
with the “P” for “Prior”, the “I” is also a concern because there is still insufficient information about 
REDD, and for the consent to be really “informed”, the information on this should also be 
communicated to the affected villagers due to FPIC. I refer to some conversations with villagers 
about their expectations, and also disappointments to REDD+ that might give some insights as to 
why FPIC would be a necessary way of introducing the projects, and maybe why the organization 
also decided to utilize the methodology after some time.  
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 This has not been part of the commitments under the bilateral funding for REDD+ initiatives in Tanzania, and TFCG 
is the only organization in Tanzania which has included FPIC as part of the process of REDD+ implementation. FPIC 
has been highly prioritized at international level in relation to REDD+, and I have therefore choosen to also put 
particular emphasis on this, as TFCG’s pilot can be crucial in the elaboration of this mechanism in Tanzania. 
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As I came back to the villages in February 2011 I did three main observations. First was that some 
people were quite confused and worried, because they had received a red cross on a tree nearby 
their farm, which meant that they were supposed to stop farming there. The cross, had been painted 
by representatives in the Village Natural Resource Committee (VNRC), which had been established 
as part of the project initiative, by TFCG and MJUMITA.  
The second observation was that some people complained they had been excluded from meetings 
on REDD+ in the village. This was, as far as I understood, meetings conducted by the VNRC, and 
hence they were not arranged for everybody, but they had still wanted to participate.  
The third observation was the clear sign that still not very many people knew much about the 
project. What was most frequently mentioned when we asked what the villagers knew was that the 
project would give them a village office and a telecommunication mast. They also mentioned other 
things, like roads, wells, dispensary and a school, things that the project would clearly not manage 
to provide – but maybe as a result of the rather questionable revenues from REDD+. These 
observations was a sign that FPIC mechanisms had not been utilized in project implementation, and 
that there would have been a need for it. 
There were differences between the two villages regarding the general perceptions to the project at 
the time I returned. In Lunenzi – the village situated far away from the road - they had little 
knowledge and relations to the project still. They were one step further in Ibingu, and the work with 
the land use planning was in progress. One of the farmers that was upset because of the boarder-
making by VNRC told me: 
 
Some of us are not satisfied with MKUHUMI because they have put the cross on our farm. I will do 
what they tell me, but I don’t know where to move because they didn’t tell us where to move. [In 
Ibingu] we have been talking about moving the farms to the other side of the village, because we 
think the soil can be good there. They [the VNRC] said that we can’t farm there neither so we don’t 
know where.
34
 
 
Robert Goodland gives an outline of the significance of FPIC, and of particular interest is what he 
writes about the “fully-informed” consent. He claims there are two ways of being fully informed. 
First the people in question have to be informed about their rights, for instance they should have 
clear ideas about their rights to the resources that are under management of the project. The consent 
                                                 
34
 MKUHUMI is the Swahili term for REDD+. 
69 
 
should be sought by neutral agents without interests in the project. Second, he says worst-case 
scenarios should be presented, and that it is impossible to obtain consent if the people in question 
have never seen an example of the project before. In the end there has to be an understanding that 
the possible benefits from the project will be larger than the possible worst-case scenarios, and that 
prudent mechanisms are in place to guarantee the benefits for the “communities”. Regarding the 
“P” for Prior, he says that the consent should be sought well before a funding agency has started to 
consider the request to finance the project. He also writes that the FPIC process can be manipulated 
(Goodland, 2004). In the following, my effort is to show that none of these considerations that 
Goodland suggests are part of TFCG / MJUMITAs process, except from maybe the last one. 
During my fieldwork I heard almost nothing about FPIC during meetings or in other conversation 
with the staff, and the impression I got of the importance of it as a mechanism within REDD+ 
through the international discourse did not correlate with how I experienced the launching of this 
pilot project. In an interview with the first Project Manager, he confirmed that FPIC was not of any 
concern for the organizations at the time he had been the manager, which was about the first 2.5 
months of my fieldwork. He said that of main concern in this period had, first, been to ensure that 
preferred forest by TFCG was to be included in the project, second, to find a way to justify this and 
make it look like it was through a participatory way through stakeholders involvement and 
consultation. Make it look like is also referring to how the guidelines for site selection and the 
report from it was developed. Third was to choose the villages, and fourth to start implementing 
activities.  This description can match some of Green’s arguments about manipulation and 
consciousness about the processes that are perhaps not only working through a “machine” 
(Ferguson, 1990), but through agents conscious actions that I emphasized in the previous section. 
The organization has a priority agenda, which is forest- and biodiversity conservation, but as a 
demand from donors, justifications of each step should be made. Therefore, to justify their methods 
of selecting certain forests of interests to funders and other stakeholders, they utilized formal 
processes of a site-selection workshop that was open to specially invited stakeholders and some 
district representatives following a fieldtrip to these four districts that had been unofficially selected 
in advance. My argument here is that TFCG does have agency and can act consciously in relation to 
processes related to funding and international development aid. They can steer part of the process in 
the direction that will benefit their agenda, but are also constrained from the demands that are 
attached to funding.  
That FPIC received very little emphasis during the initial stages of the project, is something also 
reflected in the TFCG-report on FPIC:  
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TFCG has much experience of the kind of social interaction required through FPIC, and has 
understood the importance of engaging with the community for many years, in contrast with many 
companies who have never worked with communities. TFCG was able to start with building 
relationships with communities, and carried out mapping and boundary demarcation later. The 
concept of consent has not been an issue at this early stage  
(Kibuga et al., 2011, p. 9) 
 
This excerpt shows that work on the project has started in the villages before consent had been 
given. Therefore, one can question whether this is really a valid process of FPIC. The report shows 
that the FPIC process by TFCG / MJUMITA is mainly about exchange of questions and answers 
about the REDD+ project at sub-village level. Principles and Approaches for Policy and Project 
Development says “… the first stages of respecting the right to FPIC is agreement with the relevant 
community on the process itself.” (Anderson, 2011, p. 11) The report does not say anything about 
whether information on this has been shared. The same principle-framework also says that the 
indigenous people and local communities have the right to determine the process of consultation 
and decision making themselves, and that the information about this should be “… widely 
disseminated at the local level and understood.” (Anderson, 2011, p. 21) Establishing a Village 
Natural Resource Committee is procedure as part of CBFM, and not a process determined by the 
villagers. It seems like there was some exclusiveness related to the committee, where those that 
were part of the committee could have benefits in decision-making. 
TFCG strategy on FPIC seems to be about sharing information about REDD+, and not to create any 
awareness about the rights of the people living in the villages or about FPIC itself. Regarding worst-
case scenarios - some people had made up their own minds about them – like that they would have 
to migrate – but it did not seem like the project proponent themselves had informed about any 
scenarios, like that of unclear rights to resources and the risk of conflicts with the neighboring 
village.  Due to my descriptions of the social relations within the village, one can understand that a 
lot of work can and should be done on empowerment and consciousness about the agency of people 
living in the villages selected for REDD+ to make sure that implementation will be efficient. The 
fact that TFCG did not know anything about the villages and their environment and people 
presented complications for the initial process of implementation in form of the need for 
comprehensive mapping in addition to the miscommunication between villagers and TFCG staff 
that made them bound to do a new process of land use planning.  
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Lunenzi Oye! Ibingu Juu! Meeting the villages 
 
The exclamations in the title was what the field-officers usually shouted before they started to 
speak, following responding shouts from the village audience. The gesture promoted a lively and 
informal atmosphere. The first meetings that TFCG / MJUMITA had in the villages, were with 
representatives from the sub-villages and the village authorities. A governmental representative at 
district level was also present to show the legitimacy of the NGO’s visit, and she was included in 
the “teaching-programme” that was going to take place. System and formalities surrounding 
authorities were consistent during the meetings with how the common governmental systems in the 
villages are working; the chairman and the VEO were the first to be greeted as the hosts of the 
village. They were seated in the front of the blackboard, where they introduced themselves, the 
purpose of the meeting, and wishing everybody welcome. The representatives from the village were 
sitting two by two at the benches in the classroom. Like submissive schoolchildren, some were 
sitting bent over their desks looking down in the table, some with the head in the hands.  
Eventually, the NGO-staff took over the podium and encouraged the different participants to 
present themselves by name and commission as they switched places with the village authorities. A 
common teacher-students session took place – where the NGO-staff were the “teachers”, as TFCG / 
MJUMITA field-staff were not only coming with information about REDD+, but also to teach in on 
elementary level
35
 the threats about climate change, topics such as the functions of the ozone layer 
and global warming and how it can affect their livelihood through unsteady rainfalls, floods, 
droughts and underproduction. To frame the setting of the project and making people relate to it, 
references was made to the floods in Kilosa few months earlier. The REDD+ project was presented 
as a solution to these problems, and, unlike in most cases of regular PFM projects
36
, the opportunity 
for revenues was also being mentioned. From the talk I heard around in the villages more than half 
a year later, it seemed that people had little faith in these money arriving, as they did not mention it 
as a benefit from the project when I asked about it. What they told me about was the importance of 
forest conservation – they had heard the president himself talk about it on the radio. There were 
different levels of knowledge about environmental issues, and whereas it appeared that some 
                                                 
35
 The teaching included lots of drawings on the blackboard and questions to make the village counsel, or the pupils, 
contribute. An example on teacher’s method while talking about global warming was when the teacher was drawing a 
sun on the blackboard and stated; “this is a sun.” Next he asked the pupils: “What is this?” Whereas several answered in 
a choir: “Sun”. He followed up with the next question: “And what does it do?” The answer was right, but not quite 
formulated in the way he wanted, so he formulated it himself; “sends beams down to the earth, yes”. 
36
 According to one TFCG-officer, the organization do usually not inform about the opportunities of revenues from 
PFM projects as they introduce them to the villagers. The reason for this, he said, is that ”they are not worthwhile”, 
which means that the revenues are generally low from these projects. 
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villagers had some knowledge on issues related to the greenhouse effect, others told me that this 
information had been new to them.
37
 A group of women told me after the meeting that they 
appreciated the opportunity to learn what the NGO-staff had taught them.  
The NGO-officers were encouraging the villagers to ask questions, which is an important part of the 
process of FPIC. However, the answers that they gave to these questions often contained little 
substance. For instance, one question they were asked was the common worry among the villagers 
of how to handle the eruption of bushfires. This is a very difficult issue to address anywhere, but 
since the field-officers were new in the area, they also had little understanding of the causes and 
extend of this problem. Information which I received in February 2011, was that they had started 
teaching the villagers how to “clear the line”, which is a technique to prevent the spread of 
bushfires. At the time they launched the project for the Village Assembly, they had not yet had any 
solutions to this problem. Here I will give an example of how insufficient information about project 
progress was handled in the case of the question about the bushfires: 
 
TFCG-officer: What are the reasons for bushfires here in Ibingu? 
(Different people answered; hunters, people harvesting honey and external people making charcoal) 
Woman of Village Assembly: Bushfires are common in August, September. For these 
months we should have meetings in Ibingu. It could help if the people that are responsible 
for these bushfires were caught and go to prison for seven years. 
Vise-VEO: We have to punish them by cleaning the office. 
Man 1 of VA: We do not know where the fires originate, so how can we catch them? 
Chairman: The farmers are the source of bushfires, as they cannot cultivate without clearing 
by fire. If someone is going to cultivate it means that he or she is the source of fire, and 
should be punished. 
Man 2 of VA: If fire erupts on somebody’s property, this person is the one responsible, even 
if the person was not the source of fire. 
Man 3 of VA: We have to gather people in the village for seminars on bushfires. 
TFCG-officer: Thank you very much. Are there any decisions on how to prevent this? 
Man 3 of VA: We cannot avoid bushfires, but they can be reduced. 
                                                 
37
 During my stay in Ibingu one of the primary school teachers told me that he had taken the children for a walk up in 
the forest to teach them about environmental issues and to visit the spiritual bamboo forest-area, Mianzini. This shows 
how the national and international ideas on climate change and forest conservation are mixing with traditional 
perceptions of the environment in one single class excursion. 
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Man 4 of VA: If fire erupts we will bring water to take it out. I insist that we should make 
some rules. 
Vise-VEO: We should have meetings frequently with the people from the village during 
July and August. 
Man 4 of VA: If you get 6 months in prison it will teach you a lesson. 
Man 5 of VA: I insist on prison! 
Man 3 of VA: We have to stop these punishments of cleaning the office. People say, “let me 
do it, I want to clean the office!” 
TFCG-officer: It is possible to conserve the forest and to overcome those bushfires. You 
should conserve the forest, but the process should be elaborated. 
The officer’s conclusion gives little guidance and instead of saying whether or not this project can 
offer a solution rather he tries to avoid the situation by making the villagers answer their own 
question. The common way to handle questions in some situations was to say that these questions 
would be addressed to a later stage in the process, and that this was not of the present concern. In 
that way, they could leave the question instead of giving relevance to the unknowns. I propose that 
frictions do not frequently happen when the source of information and knowledge about the issue in 
question – which in this case is the REDD+ discourse – is low, or considerably lower among one 
part than the other. This is the “rarefaction of the speaking subject”, which Foucault spoke about, 
and which means that access to participation in the discourse is limited. I believe part of the 
problem here was that the officers themselves did not have sufficient knowledge about the village-
context and the project, so when people asked them how they could overcome problems like 
bushfires and charcoal-making, they had no idea of the extent and the sources of these problems, 
and how much the project in itself was going to cover, they had therefore little basis for giving 
answers to the questions.  
For the same reasons there was also little basis to promote discussions or critical thoughts on 
feasible risks that came up during the meeting, but rather fluctuating answers to the questions that 
the villagers might be able to ask due to the preconditions to get some kind of perspective on the 
project. Since REDD+ revenues were not emphasized, most of them were probably relating the 
project to environmental threats and what they knew about similar conservation projects from other 
people or the radio. There was no opportunity for discussing “backstage”38 or to have some days to 
                                                 
38
 I use the expression here in the same sense as Ervin Goffman (1959) in his elaborations on consepts for different 
settings of human actions, depending on whether these are taking place in a person’s relative comfort-sone or 
”frontstage”, which is a setting where people are to an extended degree wearing different ”masks”, which means that a 
sort of acting is taking place. 
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think about the final decision about whether the Village Assembly would like to have the project or 
not.  
At the end of the meeting, there was one short sentence that came from a TFCG-officer, and 
everybody in the classroom raised their hands. Snap! Another officer took a photo of us. The 
assembly had been giving the first consent to introduce the project in Ibingu by the show of hands. 
No Machine, but Frictions and Euphemization 
 
The general willingness to go through with the project among the village representatives was 
evidently there. My assumption is that the opportunity to learn about how to handle environmental 
threats would not be the main reasons.  Having projects can be an attractive way of getting extra 
income for certain villagers, who might be able to help in tracing borders, patrolling the forest, and 
it was also clear from the focus group meeting which I arranged that they wished for infrastructural 
improvements in the form of roads, wells, and school in addition to preserving the forest. In the 
beginning of the meeting one of the TFCG-officers had the same “seller-role” as the UN-staff 
during the workshop I described in chapter 2. He was naming the places where they intended to 
start the project, and this village could choose to be “in” or “out”. This gave a strong feeling of 
“take it or leave it”. In the end of the meeting one man said that, “We are already accepting the 
project, since we are already conserving the forest”. I propose that there was an evident lack of 
information sharing just there, since the way that REDD+ is working, there is a need for a quite 
high rate of deforestation to create revenues through re-growth. This was at least one of the 
presumptions that TFCG had and operated with at this stage. Another sign of insufficient 
information, was as I mentioned in chapter 3, that the people living in the villages had understood 
the land use planning as a system that made restrictions so they would not be able to use or manage 
the land in certain areas at all. This indicates either insufficient information or poor follow-up 
among the field staff.  
TFCG had high ambitions about what they were going to do during the five years that they are 
piloting REDD+. Even though it seemed like TFCG, being national and not a local NGO, would 
like to exploit the opportunity of piloting REDD+ in new areas in Tanzania, I suggest that more 
knowledge of the people and the area they live in is needed – and the “rush” of REDD+ with 
unfinished frameworks and blurry guidelines has also led to confusion, unnecessary setbacks and 
delays. In the case of re-planning land use, one can see it as agency performed against the 
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“antipolitics machine” (Ferguson, 1990) at two levels. TFCG used its agency as project proponents 
to go against the “rush” of the international initiative and chose to move a step backward with the 
land use planning and try again. This was an investment for later cooperation in the villages. I 
suggest that if these “quick-start initiatives” allow for more time for pre-work and especially set as a 
standard that broad knowledge of the area and people should be a pre-condition for funding, these 
inconvenient cases could more easily be prevented. Considering the dissatisfaction among some 
villagers in February 2011, this agency might however have come from the villagers, and this is the 
second level, as they were not satisfied with the way that the land use planning had led to areas 
being put aside for conservation only, whereas TFCG / MJUMITA was advocating the need for 
more time and money, as they had to accept the fact that if this project was going to work out, it 
demanded a better process of land use planning in cooperation with villagers.  This shows how the 
NGOs are also dependant of the villagers in relation to the outcome of projects, which is some of 
the point that Kontinen (Kontinen, 2004, p. 87) also makes by referring to Hudock (1999). 
The two cases of agency performed, when Fergusson’s “machine” is not running, can also be 
termed as frictions. At village-level they seemed to erupt very seldom in relation to the project. 
People in the villages were rarely openly in disagreement with anything presented to them in 
relation to the project. One example of how I experienced this was when one of the elders in the 
village came and asked my translator and me whether there was a chance that they would have to 
migrate because of the project. This was a question to us after the village launching of the project, 
but was never raised to the NGO officers themselves that were holding the meeting. This can be a 
sign that the elder was afraid that a discussion would erupt into disagreements. After all, he was 
eager to welcome a project, if it could mean to improve prosperity for the village. Therefore, both 
the NGO-staff and the villagers did in some way adopt what James C. Scott terms a “reciprocal 
manipulation of the symbols of euphemization” (Scott, 1985, p. 309), where both parties are 
appealing to each other’s self-interested descriptions of their own acts. The NGO-staff’s description 
is helping those people who are in need of help, whereas the villagers’ description is being the 
helpless so that the help will not bypass them. But these descriptions can change if the villagers find 
that the project is not advantageous. Then, the helpless will actually be the ones that are helping the 
NGO-staff to get good outcomes from the project, like what has been the case with PFM, but this 
situation is hardly sustainable. Here I suggest that the REDD+ discourse can have agency in relation 
to the NGO’s work. The way it is today, there will be no measurable results in the form of carbon 
sequestration or improved forest cover that can show that the project has succeeded, if the projects 
are not sustainable. Therefore, if the officers have realized that the villagers have misunderstood the 
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land use planning, there might have been good reasons for them to start all over again to prevent 
those villagers from continuing business as usual in the future. 
Why did the organizations choose to include FPIC in REDD+ piloting after their Project Proposal 
had been approved for funding and the project was already running? One reason can be that as the 
only organization that has included the mechanism, they will be able to contribute with valuable 
“lessons learnt” and further contribute to the REDD+ discourse. TFCG could potentially have a 
very important role in introducing FPIC within REDD+ from a stakeholder’s point of view, as the 
only piloting organization in Tanzania that has included it in their Project Proposal. In their report 
they state: “TFCG is advocating the benefits for FPIC in Tanzania.” (Kibuga et al., 2011, p. 9) This 
makes their role central in relation to testing the mechanism and contributing “lessons learnt” in 
Tanzania. Another reason can be their experiences with villagers that had misunderstood the 
purpose of the land use planning. A third reason can be that it would strengthen their justification in 
being a national NGO without particular ties to the areas in question. 
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 Concluding Remarks 
 
This thesis has aimed to show different aspects of the REDD+ discourse that is in the making on 
several levels from different angles. As one is talking about REDD+ as a forest regime, it can be 
advantageous to get some impressions of where agency is located, which is what I have tried to do 
here. In conclusion my findings say that there is not an absolute “global regime” or “international 
force” or “machine” that are controlling all the REDD+ processes. The projects are adapted to both 
national and NGO agendas, and fall into already established discourses on development and 
environment. I have tried to illustrate this by giving an impression of how FPIC is adapted, 
although is seemingly perceived differently than the international guidelines for it, and it has been 
adjusted to the regular way that TFCG and MJUMITA are normally implementing other projects. 
NGOs have designed the proposals in a way that fits the overall goal of REDD+ with their own 
agendas and specializations in biodiversity and PFM. They do however need clear obligations so 
that they know where the project will move next, at the same time as accountability should be clear. 
There has been an immense rush to get REDD+ started, and even though the NGO’s have had own 
agendas, this has led to a perception that REDD+ is nothing new, as the debate about it has been 
blurry, and the carbon-market uncertain. The dynamics in the international REDD+ discourse is 
having effects at the lower level. Therefore, it is also important for the NGOs to have a certain 
influence in the formation and decision-making at the international level, where frictions are found. 
As I have argued, the project documents can also have agency, as they are bringing the discourse of 
REDD+ forward. In the villages, there can unfortunately be little agency located in relation to the 
project, and I have argued that the reason for this can be those of sometimes fragile “communities”. 
Therefore the selection of sites for REDD+ has to be a thorough one on the basis of not only the 
biophysical conditions, but also the human population. 
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